Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Donald Davidson, Michael V. Wedin and Samuel Scheffler

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     choose another area for these philosophers

display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers

39 ideas

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
6387 A minimum requirement for a theory of meaning is that it include an account of truth [Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
19149 If we reject corresponding 'facts', we should also give up the linked idea of 'representations' [Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
19163 You only understand an order if you know what it is to obey it [Davidson]
15160 Davidson rejected ordinary meaning, and just used truth and reference instead [Davidson, by Soames]
14612 Davidson aimed to show that language is structured by first-order logic [Davidson, by Smart]
4041 Sentences held true determine the meanings of the words they contain [Davidson]
6391 A theory of truth tells us how communication by language is possible [Davidson]
23289 Knowing the potential truth conditions of a sentence is necessary and sufficient for understanding [Davidson]
19152 Utterances have the truth conditions intended by the speaker [Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
19162 Meaning involves use, but a sentence has many uses, while meaning stays fixed [Davidson]
6395 An understood sentence can be used for almost anything; it isn't language if it has only one use [Davidson]
23290 It could be that the use of a sentence is explained by its truth conditions [Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
19131 We recognise sentences at once as linguistic units; we then figure out their parts [Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
6394 The pattern of sentences held true gives sentences their meaning [Davidson]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
6388 Is reference the key place where language and the world meet? [Davidson]
6390 With a holistic approach, we can give up reference in empirical theories of language [Davidson]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
6389 To explain the reference of a name, you must explain its sentence-role, so reference can't be defined nonlinguistically [Davidson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
19156 Modern predicates have 'places', and are sentences with singular terms deleted from the places [Davidson]
19176 The concept of truth can explain predication [Davidson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
7772 Compositionality explains how long sentences work, and truth conditions are the main compositional feature [Davidson, by Lycan]
19133 If you assign semantics to sentence parts, the sentence fails to compose a whole [Davidson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
7327 Davidson thinks Frege lacks an account of how words create sentence-meaning [Davidson, by Miller,A]
7331 A theory of meaning comes down to translating sentences into Fregean symbolic logic [Davidson, by Macey]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
19132 Top-down semantic analysis must begin with truth, as it is obvious, and explains linguistic usage [Davidson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
7769 You can state truth-conditions for "I am sick now" by relativising it to a speaker at a time [Davidson, by Lycan]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
19158 'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about humanity, so it's a different proposition from 'Socrates is human' [Davidson]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
3968 Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
8870 Content of thought is established through communication, so knowledge needs other minds [Davidson]
3970 Thought is only fully developed if we communicate with others [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
6179 Should we assume translation to define truth, or the other way around? [Blackburn on Davidson]
6399 Criteria of translation give us the identity of conceptual schemes [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
8869 The principle of charity attributes largely consistent logic and largely true beliefs to speakers [Davidson]
3971 There is simply no alternative to the 'principle of charity' in interpreting what others do [Davidson]
19154 The principle of charity says an interpreter must assume the logical constants [Davidson]
18703 Davidson's Cogito: 'I think, therefore I am generally right' [Davidson, by Button]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / d. Metaphor
7777 We accept a metaphor when we see the sentence is false [Davidson]
7776 Metaphors just mean what their words literally mean [Davidson]
7775 Understanding a metaphor is a creative act, with no rules [Davidson]
19161 We indicate use of a metaphor by its obvious falseness, or trivial truth [Davidson]