Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Eucleides, Cardinal/Hayward/Jones and Bertrand Russell

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39 ideas

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
6112 Meaning takes many different forms, depending on different logical types [Russell]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
13468 Russell started philosophy of language, by declaring some plausible sentences to be meaningless [Russell, by Hart,WD]
5388 Every understood proposition is composed of constituents with which we are acquainted [Russell]
6427 Unverifiable propositions about the remote past are still either true or false [Russell]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
1757 The Electra: she knows this man, but not that he is her brother [Eucleides, by Diog. Laertius]
4567 Russell argued with great plausibility that we rarely, if ever, refer with our words [Russell, by Cooper,DE]
19. Language / B. Reference / 2. Denoting
5810 Referring is not denoting, and Russell ignores the referential use of definite descriptions [Donnellan on Russell]
16385 A definite description 'denotes' an entity if it fits the description uniquely [Russell, by Recanati]
5774 Denoting phrases are meaningless, but guarantee meaning for propositions [Russell]
5775 In 'Scott is the author of Waverley', denotation is identical, but meaning is different [Russell]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
16987 By eliminating descriptions from primitive notation, Russell seems to reject 'sense' [Russell, by Kripke]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
5387 It is pure chance which descriptions in a person's mind make a name apply to an individual [Russell]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
4570 Russell assumes that expressions refer, but actually speakers refer by using expressions [Cooper,DE on Russell]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
9022 Russell uses 'propositional function' to refer to both predicates and to attributes [Quine on Russell]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
16349 Russell rejected sense/reference, because it made direct acquaintance with things impossible [Russell, by Recanati]
7313 'Sense' is superfluous (rather than incoherent) [Russell, by Miller,A]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
7767 The theory of definite descriptions aims at finding correct truth conditions [Russell, by Lycan]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
21550 Science reduces indexicals to a minimum, but they can never be eliminated from empirical matters [Russell]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
5776 A proposition is what we believe when we believe truly or falsely [Russell]
14451 Propositions are mainly verbal expressions of true or false, and perhaps also symbolic thoughts [Russell]
14110 Proposition contain entities indicated by words, rather than the words themselves [Russell]
21543 If p is false, then believing not-p is knowing a truth, so negative propositions must exist [Russell]
6091 Propositions don't name facts, because each fact corresponds to a proposition and its negation [Russell]
5781 Our important beliefs all, if put into words, take the form of propositions [Russell]
5782 A proposition expressed in words is a 'word-proposition', and one of images an 'image-proposition' [Russell]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
19164 If propositions are facts, then false and true propositions are indistinguishable [Davidson on Russell]
21726 In graspable propositions the constituents are real entities of acquaintance [Russell]
21702 In 1918 still believes in nonlinguistic analogues of sentences, but he now calls them 'facts' [Russell, by Quine]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
6435 You can believe the meaning of a sentence without thinking of the words [Russell]
22307 Propositions don't name facts, because two opposed propositions can match one fact [Russell]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions
14111 A proposition is a unity, and analysis destroys it [Russell]
19157 Russell said the proposition must explain its own unity - or else objective truth is impossible [Russell, by Davidson]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
7534 In 1906, Russell decided that propositions did not, after all, exist [Russell, by Monk]
21724 The main aim of the multiple relations theory of judgement was to dispense with propositions [Russell, by Linsky,B]
6094 An inventory of the world does not need to include propositions [Russell]
6096 I no longer believe in propositions, especially concerning falsehoods [Russell]
21712 I know longer believe in shadowy things like 'that today is Wednesday' when it is actually Tuesday [Russell]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
16491 If we define 'this is not blue' as disbelief in 'this is blue', we eliminate 'not' as an ingredient of facts [Russell]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
6093 The names in a logically perfect language would be private, and could not be shared [Russell]