Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Gareth Evans, Richard Rorty and Peter Klein
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9 ideas
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
2565
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Nature has no preferred way of being represented [Rorty]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
2560
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Can meanings remain the same when beliefs change? [Rorty]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
2562
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A theory of reference seems needed to pick out objects without ghostly inner states [Rorty]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
5823
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The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans]
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5825
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Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
9039
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If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
2559
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Davidson's theory of meaning focuses not on terms, but on relations between sentences [Rorty]
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19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
9043
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We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people [Evans]
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19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
9040
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Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs [Evans]
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