Combining Philosophers
Ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Kent Bach and Scott Soames
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20 ideas
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
15152
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To study meaning, study truth conditions, on the basis of syntax, and representation by the parts [Soames]
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15153
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Tarski's account of truth-conditions is too weak to determine meanings [Soames]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
10446
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Fictional reference is different inside and outside the fiction [Bach]
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10447
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We can refer to fictional entities if they are abstract objects [Bach]
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10443
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You 'allude to', not 'refer to', an individual if you keep their identity vague [Bach]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
10439
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What refers: indefinite or definite or demonstrative descriptions, names, indexicals, demonstratives? [Bach]
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10441
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If we can refer to things which change, we can't be obliged to single out their properties [Bach]
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10442
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We can think of an individual without have a uniquely characterizing description [Bach]
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10445
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It can't be real reference if it could refer to some other thing that satisfies the description [Bach]
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10457
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Since most expressions can be used non-referentially, none of them are inherently referential [Bach]
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10463
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Just alluding to or describing an object is not the same as referring to it [Bach]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
10459
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Context does not create reference; it is just something speakers can exploit [Bach]
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10460
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'That duck' may not refer to the most obvious one in the group [Bach]
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10461
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What a pronoun like 'he' refers back to is usually a matter of speaker's intentions [Bach]
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10462
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Information comes from knowing who is speaking, not just from interpretation of the utterance [Bach]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
13965
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Semantics as theory of meaning and semantics as truth-based logical consequence are very different [Soames]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
13964
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Semantic content is a proposition made of sentence constituents (not some set of circumstances) [Soames]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
13972
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Two-dimensionalism reinstates descriptivism, and reconnects necessity and apriority to analyticity [Soames]
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
15154
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We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa [Soames]
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19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
10458
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People slide from contextual variability all the way to contextual determination [Bach]
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