Combining Philosophers
Ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Saul A. Kripke and John Perry
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21 ideas
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
7305
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Kripke's Wittgenstein says meaning 'vanishes into thin air' [Kripke, by Miller,A]
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19270
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If you ask what is in your mind for following the addition rule, meaning just seems to vanish [Kripke]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
17874
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Kripke has a definitional account of kinds, but not of naming [Almog on Kripke]
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16394
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Kripke derives accounts of reference and proper names from assumptions about worlds and essences [Stalnaker on Kripke]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
5822
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The important cause is not between dubbing and current use, but between the item and the speaker's information [Evans on Kripke]
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17033
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We may refer through a causal chain, but still change what is referred to [Kripke]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
4689
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Kripke makes reference a largely social matter, external to the mind of the speaker [Kripke, by McGinn]
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17504
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Kripke's theory is important because it gives a collective account of reference [Kripke, by Putnam]
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17035
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We refer through the community, going back to the original referent [Kripke]
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4956
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A description may fix a reference even when it is not true of its object [Kripke]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
16988
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Descriptive reference shows how to refer, how to identify two things, and how to challenge existence [Kripke, by PG]
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17029
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It can't be necessary that Aristotle had the properties commonly attributed to him [Kripke]
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17032
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Even if Gödel didn't produce his theorems, he's still called 'Gödel' [Kripke]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
11076
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Community implies assertability-conditions rather than truth-conditions semantics [Kripke, by Hanna]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
12151
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If we replace 'I' in sentences about me, they are different beliefs and explanations of behaviour [Perry]
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18412
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Indexicals individuate certain belief states, helping in explanation and prediction [Perry]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
14893
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Rigid designation creates a puzzle - why do some necessary truths appear to be contingent? [Kripke, by Maciŕ/Garcia-Carpentiro]
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
4897
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A proposition is a set of possible worlds for which its intension delivers truth [Perry]
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
12150
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Indexicals reveal big problems with the traditional idea of a proposition [Perry]
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19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
4890
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A sharp analytic/synthetic line can rarely be drawn, but some concepts are central to thought [Perry]
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19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
11075
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The sceptical rule-following paradox is the basis of the private language argument [Kripke, by Hanna]
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