Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Hermarchus, E Reck / M Price and Willard Quine
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49 ideas
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
1626
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It is troublesome nonsense to split statements into a linguistic and a factual component [Quine]
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8898
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Inculcations of meanings of words rests ultimately on sensory evidence [Quine]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
22430
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If we understand a statement, we know the circumstances of its truth [Quine]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
21700
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Taking sentences as the unit of meaning makes useful paraphrasing possible [Quine]
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21701
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Knowing a word is knowing the meanings of sentences which contain it [Quine]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
1619
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There is an attempt to give a verificationist account of meaning, without the error of reducing everything to sensations [Dennett on Quine]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
7317
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'Renate' and 'cordate' have identical extensions, but are not synonymous [Quine, by Miller,A]
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9009
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Single words are strongly synonymous if their interchange preserves truth [Quine]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
1621
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Once meaning and reference are separated, meaning ceases to seem important [Quine]
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9471
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Intensions are creatures of darkness which should be exorcised [Quine]
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8202
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Meaning is essence divorced from things and wedded to words [Quine]
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1609
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I do not believe there is some abstract entity called a 'meaning' which we can 'have' [Quine]
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1617
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The word 'meaning' is only useful when talking about significance or about synonymy [Quine]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
4712
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Quine says there is no matter of fact about reference - it is 'inscrutable' [Quine, by O'Grady]
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8470
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Reference is inscrutable, because we cannot choose between theories of numbers [Quine, by Orenstein]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
15788
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Syntax and semantics are indeterminate, and modern 'semantics' is a bogus subject [Quine, by Lycan]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
19159
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Quine relates predicates to their objects, by being 'true of' them [Quine, by Davidson]
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16932
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Projectible predicates can be universalised about the kind to which they refer [Quine]
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
18967
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A 'proposition' is said to be the timeless cognitive part of the meaning of a sentence [Quine]
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
18968
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The problem with propositions is their individuation. When do two sentences express one proposition? [Quine]
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9007
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It makes no sense to say that two sentences express the same proposition [Quine]
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9008
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There is no rule for separating the information from other features of sentences [Quine]
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9010
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We can abandon propositions, and just talk of sentences and equivalence [Quine]
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19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
9371
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Analytic statements are either logical truths (all reinterpretations) or they depend on synonymy [Quine]
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19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
19487
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Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine]
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19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
1622
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Did someone ever actually define 'bachelor' as 'unmarried man'? [Quine]
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9366
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Quine's attack on analyticity undermined linguistic views of necessity, and analytic views of the a priori [Quine, by Boghossian]
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14473
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Quine attacks the Fregean idea that we can define analyticity through synonyous substitution [Quine, by Thomasson]
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7321
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The last two parts of 'Two Dogmas' are much the best [Miller,A on Quine]
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8803
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Erasing the analytic/synthetic distinction got rid of meanings, and saved philosophy of language [Davidson on Quine]
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17737
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The analytic needs excessively small units of meaning and empirical confirmation [Quine, by Jenkins]
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1624
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If we try to define analyticity by synonymy, that leads back to analyticity [Quine]
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8900
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In observation sentences, we could substitute community acceptance for analyticity [Quine]
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8201
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The distinction between meaning and further information is as vague as the essence/accident distinction [Quine]
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19050
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Holism in language blurs empirical synthetic and empty analytic sentences [Quine]
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21338
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I will even consider changing a meaning to save a law; I question the meaning-fact cleavage [Quine]
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19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
9021
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A good way of explaining an expression is saying what conditions make its contexts true [Quine]
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19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / a. Translation
19045
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Translation is too flimsy a notion to support theories of cultural incommensurability [Quine]
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19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
3988
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Indeterminacy of translation also implies indeterminacy in interpreting people's mental states [Dennett on Quine]
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6311
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The firmer the links between sentences and stimuli, the less translations can diverge [Quine]
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6312
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We can never precisely pin down how to translate the native word 'Gavagai' [Quine]
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6313
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Stimulus synonymy of 'Gavagai' and 'Rabbit' does not even guarantee they are coextensive [Quine]
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6317
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Dispositions to speech behaviour, and actual speech, are never enough to fix any one translation [Quine]
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1631
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You could know the complete behavioural conditions for a foreign language, and still not know their beliefs [Quine]
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1632
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Translation of our remote past or language could be as problematic as alien languages [Quine]
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18963
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Indeterminacy translating 'rabbit' depends on translating individuation terms [Quine]
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19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
6315
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We should be suspicious of a translation which implies that a people have very strange beliefs [Quine]
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6314
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Weird translations are always possible, but they improve if we impose our own logic on them [Quine]
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7330
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The principle of charity only applies to the logical constants [Quine, by Miller,A]
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