Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Hermarchus, Gilbert Harman and Alvin Plantinga
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19 ideas
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
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3078
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Speech acts, communication, representation and truth form a single theory [Harman]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
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12590
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Take meaning to be use in calculation with concepts, rather than in communication [Harman]
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12593
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The use theory attaches meanings to words, not to sentences [Harman]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
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12588
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Meaning from use of thoughts, constructed from concepts, which have a role relating to reality [Harman]
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12589
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Some regard conceptual role semantics as an entirely internal matter [Harman]
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12600
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The content of thought is relations, between mental states, things in the world, and contexts [Harman]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
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3090
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There is only similarity in meaning, never sameness in meaning [Harman]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 9. Ambiguity
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3082
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Ambiguity is when different underlying truth-conditional structures have the same surface form [Harman]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
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3079
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Truth in a language is explained by how the structural elements of a sentence contribute to its truth conditions [Harman]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
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16469
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Plantinga has domains of sets of essences, variables denoting essences, and predicates as functions [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
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16470
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Plantinga's essences have their own properties - so will have essences, giving a hierarchy [Stalnaker on Plantinga]
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
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14663
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Are propositions and states of affairs two separate things, or only one? I incline to say one [Plantinga]
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3085
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Sentences are different from propositions, since two sentences can express one proposition [Harman]
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
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9085
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If propositions are concrete they don't have to exist, and so they can't be necessary truths [Plantinga]
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
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9084
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Propositions can't just be in brains, because 'there are no human beings' might be true [Plantinga]
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19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
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3087
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The analytic/synthetic distinction is a silly division of thought into encyclopaedia and dictionary [Harman]
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19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
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12594
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If one proposition negates the other, which is the negative one? [Harman]
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19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / a. Translation
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12591
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Mastery of a language requires thinking, and not just communication [Harman]
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19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
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3083
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Many predicates totally resist translation, so a universal underlying structure to languages is unlikely [Harman]
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