Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Jerry A. Fodor, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Nicolas Malebranche

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62 ideas

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
2439 Semantic externalism says the concept 'elm' needs no further beliefs or inferences [Fodor]
2457 If meaning is information, that establishes the causal link between the state of the world and our beliefs [Fodor]
23450 Wittgenstein rejected his earlier view that the form of language is the form of the world [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
23482 The 'form' of the picture is its possible combinations [Wittgenstein]
23481 Propositions assemble a world experimentally, like the model of a road accident [Wittgenstein]
18283 Language pictures the essence of the world [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
2998 Grice thinks meaning is inherited from the propositional attitudes which sentences express [Fodor]
2482 It seems unlikely that meaning can be reduced to communicative intentions, or any mental states [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
8172 To understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is true [Wittgenstein]
18725 A proposition draws a line around the facts which agree with it [Wittgenstein]
3006 Whatever in the mind delivers falsehood is parasitic on what delivers truth [Fodor]
2451 To know the content of a thought is to know what would make it true [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
18282 You can't believe it if you can't imagine a verification for it [Wittgenstein]
18728 The meaning of a proposition is the mode of its verification [Wittgenstein]
7086 Good philosophy asserts science, and demonstrates the meaninglessness of metaphysics [Wittgenstein]
4150 Asking about verification is only one way of asking about the meaning of a proposition [Wittgenstein]
3007 Many different verification procedures can reach 'star', but it only has one semantic value [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
6567 For Wittgenstein, words are defined by their use, just as chess pieces are [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin]
6169 We do not achieve meaning and understanding in our heads, but in the world [Wittgenstein, by Rowlands]
4155 We all seem able to see quite clearly how sentences represent things when we use them [Wittgenstein]
3004 The meaning of a sentence derives from its use in expressing an attitude [Fodor]
4137 In the majority of cases the meaning of a word is its use in the language [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
18705 Words function only in propositions, like levers in a machine [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
4142 To understand a sentence means to understand a language [Wittgenstein]
3000 Meaning holism is a crazy doctrine [Fodor]
2433 For holists no two thoughts are ever quite the same, which destroys faith in meaning [Fodor]
2477 If to understand "fish" you must know facts about them, where does that end? [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
3003 Very different mental states can share their contents, so content doesn't seem to be constructed from functional role [Fodor]
12634 'Inferential-role semantics' says meaning is determined by role in inference [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
2996 Mental states may have the same content but different extensions [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
4721 If you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of the meaning of your words either [Wittgenstein]
4149 We don't have 'meanings' in our minds in addition to verbal expressions [Wittgenstein]
4156 Make the following experiment: say "It's cold here" and mean "It's warm here" [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
12642 Co-referring terms differ if they have different causal powers [Fodor]
12663 We refer to individuals and to properties, and we use singular terms and predicates [Fodor]
4145 How do words refer to sensations? [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
4140 The standard metre in Paris is neither one metre long nor not one metre long [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
2436 It is claimed that reference doesn't fix sense (Jocasta), and sense doesn't fix reference (Twin Earth) [Fodor]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
2434 Broad semantics holds that the basic semantic properties are truth and denotation [Fodor]
12616 English has no semantic theory, just associations between sentences and thoughts [Fodor]
12645 Semantics (esp. referential semantics) allows inferences from utterances to the world [Fodor]
12646 Semantics relates to the world, so it is never just psychological [Fodor]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
23511 Propositions use old expressions for a new sense [Wittgenstein]
23488 Propositions are understood via their constituents [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
2459 Externalist semantics are necessary to connect the contents of beliefs with how the world is [Fodor]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
18711 A proposition is any expression which can be significantly negated [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
23486 Pictures are possible situations in logical space [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
23490 A thought is mental constituents that relate to reality as words do [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
2473 Analysis is impossible without the analytic/synthetic distinction [Fodor]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
23497 Solipsism is correct, but can only be shown, not said, by the limits of my personal language [Wittgenstein]
6166 Was Wittgenstein's problem between individual and community, or between occasions for an individual? [Rowlands on Wittgenstein]
7875 If a brilliant child invented a name for a private sensation, it couldn't communicate it [Wittgenstein]
4146 We cannot doublecheck mental images for correctness (or confirm news with many copies of the paper) [Wittgenstein]
4147 If we only named pain by our own case, it would be like naming beetles by looking in a private box [Wittgenstein]
5659 If the reference is private, that is incompatible with the sense being public [Wittgenstein, by Scruton]
4152 Getting from perceptions to words cannot be a private matter; the rules need an institution of use [Wittgenstein]
2484 The theory of the content of thought as 'Mentalese' explains why the Private Language Argument doesn't work [Fodor]
4136 To imagine a language means to imagine a form of life [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / a. Translation
23489 We translate by means of proposition constituents, not by whole propositions [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
6318 The doctrine of indeterminacy of translation seems implied by the later Wittgenstein [Wittgenstein, by Quine]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
4144 Common human behaviour enables us to interpret an unknown language [Wittgenstein]
11049 To communicate, language needs agreement in judgment as well as definition [Wittgenstein]