Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Jerry A. Fodor, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Scott Soames
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35 ideas
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
2439
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Semantic externalism says the concept 'elm' needs no further beliefs or inferences [Fodor]
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2457
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If meaning is information, that establishes the causal link between the state of the world and our beliefs [Fodor]
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23450
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Wittgenstein rejected his earlier view that the form of language is the form of the world [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
23482
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The 'form' of the picture is its possible combinations [Wittgenstein]
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23481
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Propositions assemble a world experimentally, like the model of a road accident [Wittgenstein]
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18283
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Language pictures the essence of the world [Wittgenstein]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
2998
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Grice thinks meaning is inherited from the propositional attitudes which sentences express [Fodor]
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2482
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It seems unlikely that meaning can be reduced to communicative intentions, or any mental states [Fodor]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
8172
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To understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is true [Wittgenstein]
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18725
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A proposition draws a line around the facts which agree with it [Wittgenstein]
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3006
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Whatever in the mind delivers falsehood is parasitic on what delivers truth [Fodor]
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2451
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To know the content of a thought is to know what would make it true [Fodor]
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15152
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To study meaning, study truth conditions, on the basis of syntax, and representation by the parts [Soames]
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15153
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Tarski's account of truth-conditions is too weak to determine meanings [Soames]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
18282
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You can't believe it if you can't imagine a verification for it [Wittgenstein]
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18728
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The meaning of a proposition is the mode of its verification [Wittgenstein]
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7086
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Good philosophy asserts science, and demonstrates the meaninglessness of metaphysics [Wittgenstein]
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4150
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Asking about verification is only one way of asking about the meaning of a proposition [Wittgenstein]
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3007
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Many different verification procedures can reach 'star', but it only has one semantic value [Fodor]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
6567
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For Wittgenstein, words are defined by their use, just as chess pieces are [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin]
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6169
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We do not achieve meaning and understanding in our heads, but in the world [Wittgenstein, by Rowlands]
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4155
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We all seem able to see quite clearly how sentences represent things when we use them [Wittgenstein]
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3004
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The meaning of a sentence derives from its use in expressing an attitude [Fodor]
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4137
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In the majority of cases the meaning of a word is its use in the language [Wittgenstein]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
18705
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Words function only in propositions, like levers in a machine [Wittgenstein]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
4142
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To understand a sentence means to understand a language [Wittgenstein]
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3000
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Meaning holism is a crazy doctrine [Fodor]
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2433
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For holists no two thoughts are ever quite the same, which destroys faith in meaning [Fodor]
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2477
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If to understand "fish" you must know facts about them, where does that end? [Fodor]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
3003
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Very different mental states can share their contents, so content doesn't seem to be constructed from functional role [Fodor]
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12634
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'Inferential-role semantics' says meaning is determined by role in inference [Fodor]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
2996
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Mental states may have the same content but different extensions [Fodor]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
4721
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If you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of the meaning of your words either [Wittgenstein]
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4149
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We don't have 'meanings' in our minds in addition to verbal expressions [Wittgenstein]
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4156
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Make the following experiment: say "It's cold here" and mean "It's warm here" [Wittgenstein]
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