Combining Philosophers
Ideas for John Cottingham, Gottlob Frege and Gilbert Ryle
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11 ideas
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
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'Propositions' name what is thought, because 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are too ambiguous [Ryle]
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
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For all the multiplicity of languages, mankind has a common stock of thoughts [Frege]
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Thoughts are not subjective or psychological, because some thoughts are the same for us all [Frege]
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A thought is the sense expressed by a sentence, and is what we prove [Frege]
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A 'thought' is something for which the question of truth can arise; thoughts are senses of sentences [Frege]
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
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Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion [Ryle]
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We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French [Ryle]
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions
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The parts of a thought map onto the parts of a sentence [Frege]
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A sentence is only a thought if it is complete, and has a time-specification [Frege]
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
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There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way [Ryle]
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If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones [Ryle]
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