Combining Philosophers
Ideas for John Cottingham, Gottlob Frege and Richard Posner
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11 ideas
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
9167
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Frege felt that meanings must be public, so they are abstractions rather than mental entities [Frege, by Putnam]
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9583
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Psychological logicians are concerned with sense of words, but mathematicians study the reference [Frege]
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9584
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Identity baffles psychologists, since A and B must be presented differently to identify them [Frege]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
22318
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Frege failed to show when two sets of truth-conditions are equivalent [Frege, by Potter]
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7307
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A thought is not psychological, but a condition of the world that makes a sentence true [Frege, by Miller,A]
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4980
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The meaning (reference) of a sentence is its truth value - the circumstance of it being true or false [Frege]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
16879
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A sign won't gain sense just from being used in sentences with familiar components [Frege]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
8646
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Words in isolation seem to have ideas as meanings, but words have meaning in propositions [Frege]
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7732
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Never ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a proposition [Frege]
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8446
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We understand new propositions by constructing their sense from the words [Frege]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
9180
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Holism says all language use is also a change in the rules of language [Frege, by Dummett]
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