Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, David Lewis and Mulligan/Simons/Smith
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11 ideas
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
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A theory of perspectival de se content gives truth conditions relative to an agent [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
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A particular functional role is what gives content to a thought [Lewis]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
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Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
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Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis]
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
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A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true [Lewis]
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9654
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A proposition is a set of entire possible worlds which instantiate a particular property [Lewis]
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A proposition is the property of being a possible world where it holds true [Lewis]
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15738
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Propositions can't have syntactic structure if they are just sets of worlds [Lewis]
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19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
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A sophisticated principle of charity sometimes imputes error as well as truth [Lewis]
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8615
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We need natural properties in order to motivate the principle of charity [Lewis]
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Basic to pragmatics is taking a message in a way that makes sense of it [Lewis]
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