Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, E.J. Lowe and Hilary Putnam
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29 ideas
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
6282
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Theory of meaning presupposes theory of understanding and reference [Putnam]
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2346
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Meaning and translation (which are needed to define truth) both presuppose the notion of reference [Putnam]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
7722
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If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
6281
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Truth conditions can't explain understanding a sentence, because that in turn needs explanation [Putnam]
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6278
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We should reject the view that truth is prior to meaning [Putnam]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
2354
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"Meaning is use" is not a definition of meaning [Putnam]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
2336
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Holism seems to make fixed definition more or less impossible [Putnam]
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2334
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Meaning holism tried to show that you can't get fixed meanings built out of observation terms [Putnam]
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2335
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Understanding a sentence involves background knowledge and can't be done in isolation [Putnam]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
6271
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How reference is specified is not what reference is [Putnam]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
16550
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Direct reference doesn't seem to require that thinkers know what it is they are thinking about [Lowe]
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2340
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We should separate how the reference of 'gold' is fixed from its conceptual content [Putnam]
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2341
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Like names, natural kind terms have their meaning fixed by extension and reference [Putnam]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
17506
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I now think reference by the tests of experts is a special case of being causally connected [Putnam]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
2338
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Reference (say to 'elms') is a social phenomenon which we can leave to experts [Putnam]
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14202
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Neither individual nor community mental states fix reference [Putnam]
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9170
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We need to recognise the contribution of society and of the world in determining reference [Putnam]
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14201
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Maybe the total mental state of a language community fixes the reference of a term [Putnam]
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2339
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Aristotle implies that we have the complete concepts of a language in our heads, but we don't [Putnam]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
3893
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Often reference determines sense, and not (as Frege thought) vice versa [Putnam, by Scruton]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
6268
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The claim that scientific terms are incommensurable can be blocked if scientific terms are not descriptions [Putnam]
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
6632
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The same proposition provides contents for the that-clause of an utterance and a belief [Lowe]
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
6631
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If propositions are abstract entities, how can minds depend on their causal powers? [Lowe]
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19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
5817
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Language is more like a cooperative steamship than an individual hammer [Putnam]
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6279
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A private language could work with reference and beliefs, and wouldn't need meaning [Putnam]
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19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
6270
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The correct translation is the one that explains the speaker's behaviour [Putnam]
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6283
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Language maps the world in many ways (because it maps onto other languages in many ways) [Putnam]
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14206
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There are infinitely many interpretations of a sentence which can all seem to be 'correct' [Putnam]
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19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
6275
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You can't say 'most speaker's beliefs are true'; in some areas this is not so, and you can't count beliefs [Putnam]
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