Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Stephen Yablo and Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh
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12 ideas
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
18992
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Sentence-meaning is the truth-conditions - plus factors responsible for them [Yablo]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
18994
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The content of an assertion can be quite different from compositional content [Yablo]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
18413
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Fregeans can't agree on what 'senses' are [Cappelen/Dever]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
18997
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Truth-conditions as subject-matter has problems of relevance, short cut, and reversal [Yablo]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
18417
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Possible worlds accounts of content are notoriously coarse-grained [Cappelen/Dever]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
18408
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Indexicals are just non-constant in meaning, and don't involve any special concepts [Cappelen/Dever]
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18414
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Fregeans say 'I' differs in reference, so it must also differ in sense [Cappelen/Dever]
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18423
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All indexicals can be expressed non-indexically [Cappelen/Dever]
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19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
19005
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Not-A is too strong to just erase an improper assertion, because it actually reverses A [Yablo]
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19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
18406
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The basic Kaplan view is that there is truth-conditional content, and contextual character [Cappelen/Dever]
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18411
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It is proposed that a huge range of linguistic items are context-sensitive [Cappelen/Dever]
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19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / d. Metaphor
8861
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Hardly a word in the language is devoid of metaphorical potential [Yablo]
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