Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Mark Sainsbury, Bertrand Russell and Paul M. Pietroski
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41 ideas
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
6112
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Meaning takes many different forms, depending on different logical types [Russell]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
13468
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Russell started philosophy of language, by declaring some plausible sentences to be meaningless [Russell, by Hart,WD]
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5388
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Every understood proposition is composed of constituents with which we are acquainted [Russell]
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6427
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Unverifiable propositions about the remote past are still either true or false [Russell]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
4567
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Russell argued with great plausibility that we rarely, if ever, refer with our words [Russell, by Cooper,DE]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 2. Denoting
5810
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Referring is not denoting, and Russell ignores the referential use of definite descriptions [Donnellan on Russell]
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16385
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A definite description 'denotes' an entity if it fits the description uniquely [Russell, by Recanati]
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5774
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Denoting phrases are meaningless, but guarantee meaning for propositions [Russell]
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5775
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In 'Scott is the author of Waverley', denotation is identical, but meaning is different [Russell]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
10432
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A new usage of a name could arise from a mistaken baptism of nothing [Sainsbury]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
16987
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By eliminating descriptions from primitive notation, Russell seems to reject 'sense' [Russell, by Kripke]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
5387
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It is pure chance which descriptions in a person's mind make a name apply to an individual [Russell]
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19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
4570
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Russell assumes that expressions refer, but actually speakers refer by using expressions [Cooper,DE on Russell]
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10434
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Even a quantifier like 'someone' can be used referentially [Sainsbury]
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21650
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No language is semantically referential; it all occurs at the level of thought or utterance [Pietroski, by Hofweber]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
9022
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Russell uses 'propositional function' to refer to both predicates and to attributes [Quine on Russell]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
16349
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Russell rejected sense/reference, because it made direct acquaintance with things impossible [Russell, by Recanati]
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7313
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'Sense' is superfluous (rather than incoherent) [Russell, by Miller,A]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
7767
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The theory of definite descriptions aims at finding correct truth conditions [Russell, by Lycan]
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
21550
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Science reduces indexicals to a minimum, but they can never be eliminated from empirical matters [Russell]
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
5776
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A proposition is what we believe when we believe truly or falsely [Russell]
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14451
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Propositions are mainly verbal expressions of true or false, and perhaps also symbolic thoughts [Russell]
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14110
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Proposition contain entities indicated by words, rather than the words themselves [Russell]
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21543
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If p is false, then believing not-p is knowing a truth, so negative propositions must exist [Russell]
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6091
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Propositions don't name facts, because each fact corresponds to a proposition and its negation [Russell]
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5781
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Our important beliefs all, if put into words, take the form of propositions [Russell]
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5782
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A proposition expressed in words is a 'word-proposition', and one of images an 'image-proposition' [Russell]
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
19164
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If propositions are facts, then false and true propositions are indistinguishable [Davidson on Russell]
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21726
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In graspable propositions the constituents are real entities of acquaintance [Russell]
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21702
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In 1918 still believes in nonlinguistic analogues of sentences, but he now calls them 'facts' [Russell, by Quine]
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
6435
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You can believe the meaning of a sentence without thinking of the words [Russell]
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22307
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Propositions don't name facts, because two opposed propositions can match one fact [Russell]
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions
14111
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A proposition is a unity, and analysis destroys it [Russell]
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19157
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Russell said the proposition must explain its own unity - or else objective truth is impossible [Russell, by Davidson]
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
7534
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In 1906, Russell decided that propositions did not, after all, exist [Russell, by Monk]
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21724
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The main aim of the multiple relations theory of judgement was to dispense with propositions [Russell, by Linsky,B]
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6094
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An inventory of the world does not need to include propositions [Russell]
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6096
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I no longer believe in propositions, especially concerning falsehoods [Russell]
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21712
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I know longer believe in shadowy things like 'that today is Wednesday' when it is actually Tuesday [Russell]
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19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
16491
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If we define 'this is not blue' as disbelief in 'this is blue', we eliminate 'not' as an ingredient of facts [Russell]
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19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
6093
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The names in a logically perfect language would be private, and could not be shared [Russell]
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