Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Xenocrates, Lycophron and Jerry A. Fodor

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24 ideas

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
2439 Semantic externalism says the concept 'elm' needs no further beliefs or inferences [Fodor]
2457 If meaning is information, that establishes the causal link between the state of the world and our beliefs [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
2998 Grice thinks meaning is inherited from the propositional attitudes which sentences express [Fodor]
2482 It seems unlikely that meaning can be reduced to communicative intentions, or any mental states [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
3006 Whatever in the mind delivers falsehood is parasitic on what delivers truth [Fodor]
2451 To know the content of a thought is to know what would make it true [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
3007 Many different verification procedures can reach 'star', but it only has one semantic value [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
3004 The meaning of a sentence derives from its use in expressing an attitude [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
3000 Meaning holism is a crazy doctrine [Fodor]
2433 For holists no two thoughts are ever quite the same, which destroys faith in meaning [Fodor]
2477 If to understand "fish" you must know facts about them, where does that end? [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
3003 Very different mental states can share their contents, so content doesn't seem to be constructed from functional role [Fodor]
12634 'Inferential-role semantics' says meaning is determined by role in inference [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
2996 Mental states may have the same content but different extensions [Fodor]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
12642 Co-referring terms differ if they have different causal powers [Fodor]
12663 We refer to individuals and to properties, and we use singular terms and predicates [Fodor]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
2436 It is claimed that reference doesn't fix sense (Jocasta), and sense doesn't fix reference (Twin Earth) [Fodor]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
2434 Broad semantics holds that the basic semantic properties are truth and denotation [Fodor]
12616 English has no semantic theory, just associations between sentences and thoughts [Fodor]
12645 Semantics (esp. referential semantics) allows inferences from utterances to the world [Fodor]
12646 Semantics relates to the world, so it is never just psychological [Fodor]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
2459 Externalist semantics are necessary to connect the contents of beliefs with how the world is [Fodor]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
2473 Analysis is impossible without the analytic/synthetic distinction [Fodor]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
2484 The theory of the content of thought as 'Mentalese' explains why the Private Language Argument doesn't work [Fodor]