Combining Philosophers

Ideas for B Hale / C Wright, Aristotle and J Fodor / E Lepore

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     choose another area for these philosophers

display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers


5 ideas

2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
It is a fallacy to explain the obscure with the even more obscure [Hale/Wright]
     Full Idea: The fallacy of 'ad obscurum per obscurius' is to explain the obscure by appeal to what is more obscure.
     From: B Hale / C Wright (The Metaontology of Abstraction [2009], §3)
     A reaction: Not strictly a fallacy, so much as an example of inadequate explanation, along with circularity and infinite regresses.
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 2. Infinite Regress
Not everything can be proven, because that would lead to an infinite regress [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: It must be true, quite generally, that not everything can be proven, on pain of an infinite regress.
     From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1006a09)
     A reaction: Compare Idea 1672, where the possibility of a circular set of mutual proofs is considered. Aristotle seems committed to the present idea.
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 3. Question Begging
Men are natural leaders (apart from the unnatural ones) [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: A male, unless he is somehow formed contrary to nature, is by nature more capable of leading than a female.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1259b01)
     A reaction: Beautiful! The greatest of all philosophers offers us a perfect perpetration of the No True Scotsman Fallacy! If the question is 'are men natural leaders?', this seems to beg it.
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 5. Fallacy of Composition
'If each is small, so too are all' is in one way false, for the whole composed of all is not small [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The sophistical argument 'if each is small, so too are all' is in one way true and in another false. For the whole composed of all the parts is not small, but it is composed of small parts.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1307b36)
     A reaction: If neurons can't think, then brains can't think.
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / a. Category mistakes
The differentiae of genera which are different are themselves different in kind [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The differentiae of genera which are different and not subordinate one to the other are themselves different in kind.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 01b16)
     A reaction: This seems to be indicating a category mistake, as he warns us not to attribute the wrong kind of differentiae to something we are picking out.