6566
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The problem is to explain the role of contradiction in social life [Wittgenstein]
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Full Idea:
When a contradiction appears, we say: "I didn't mean it like that"; the civil status of a contradiction, or its status in civil life: there is the philosophical problem.
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From:
Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §125), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.2
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A reaction:
The point is that logical concepts such as contradiction are conventional, and not all-or-nothing, so we might agree that you didn't really contradict yourself (when perhaps you uttered a witty ironic paradox). I don't see the problem as philosophical.
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19463
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Induction assumes some uniformity in nature, or that in some respects the future is like the past [Ayer]
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Full Idea:
In all inductive reasoning we make the assumption that there is a measure of uniformity in nature; or, roughly speaking, that the future will, in the appropriate respects, resemble the past.
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From:
A.J. Ayer (The Problem of Knowledge [1956], 2.viii)
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A reaction:
I would say that nature is 'stable'. Nature changes, so a global assumption of total uniformity is daft. Do we need some global uniformity assumptions, if the induction involved is local? I would say yes. Are all inductions conditional on this?
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18719
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Grammar says that saying 'sound is red' is not false, but nonsense [Wittgenstein]
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Full Idea:
If grammar says that you cannot say that a sound is red, it means not that it is false to say so but that it is nonsense - i.e. not a language at all.
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From:
Ludwig Wittgenstein (Lectures 1930-32 (student notes) [1931], B IX.6)
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A reaction:
I am baffled as to why he thinks 'grammar' is what prohibits such a statement. Surely the world, the nature of sound and colour, is what makes the application of the predicate wrong. Sounds aren't coloured, so they can't be red. False, not nonsense.
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