display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
3 ideas
17621 | What matters in mathematics is its objectivity, not the existence of the objects [Dummett] |
Full Idea: As Kreisel has remarked, what is important is not the existence of mathematical objects, but the objectivity of mathematical statements. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
A reaction: [see Maddy 2011:115 for the history of this idea] It seems rather unclear where Frege stands on objectivity. Maddy embraces it, following up this idea, and Tyler Burge's fat book on objectivity. |
9847 | A contextual definition permits the elimination of the expression by a substitution [Dummett] |
Full Idea: The standard sense of a 'contextual definition' permits the eliminating of the defined expression, by transforming any sentence containing it into an equivalent one not containing it. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege philosophy of mathematics [1991], Ch.11) | |
A reaction: So the whole definition might be eliminated by a single word, which is not equivalent to the target word, which is embedded in the original expression. Clearly contextual definitions have some problems |
19067 | A successful proof requires recognition of truth at every step [Dummett] |
Full Idea: For a demonstration to be cogent it is necessary that the passage from step to step involve a recognition of truth at each line. | |
From: Michael Dummett (The Justification of Deduction [1973], p.313) | |
A reaction: Dummett cited Quine (esp. 1970) as having an almost entirely syntactic view of logic. Rumfitt points out that logic can move validly from one falsehood to another. Even a 'proof' might detour into falsehood, but it would not be a 'canonical' proof! |