Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Herodotus, Mark Colyvan and Friedrich Nietzsche

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7 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Objectivity is not disinterestedness (impossible), but the ability to switch perspectives [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: 'Objectivity' should be understood not as 'contemplation without interest' (a non-concept and an absurdity), but as having in our power the ability to engage and disengage our 'pros' and 'cons'; we can use the difference in perspectives for knowledge.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], III.§12)
     A reaction: Note that he will use perspectives to achieve knowledge. The idea that Perspectivalism is mere relativism is labelled as 'extreme' in Idea 4486. He is right that objectivity is a mental capacity and achievement of individuals.
Could not the objective character of things be merely a difference of degree within the subjective? [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Could not the objective character of things be merely a difference of degree within the subjective?
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §560)
     A reaction: A reasonable speculation. I begin to feel my opinions are objective if they are reinforced by the agreement of others. One can believe in the facts, but despair of objectivity. It is called 'scepticism'. Buf cf. T.Nagel.
Seeing with other eyes is more egoism, but exploring other perspectives leads to objectivity [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Wanting to know things as they are - that alone is the good inclination: not seeing ..with other eyes; that would be merely a change of place of egoistic seeing. …Practise at seeing with other eyes, and without human relationships, hence objectively!
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1881-82 [1882], 11[013])
     A reaction: That Nietzsche thinks we should try to see things objectively will come as a bit of a shock to those who have him catalogued among the relativists. It's clear from other writings that he thinks (rightly) that perfect objectivity is unattainable.
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Reason is a mere idiosyncrasy of a certain species of animal [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Reason is a mere idiosyncrasy of a certain species of animal.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §515)
     A reaction: Call me narrow-minded, prejudiced and arrogant, but I just don't believe this. Rational minds meet across cultures, and good reasons can rise above culture. However, I may be wrong about this…
Reason is just another organic drive, developing late, and fighting for equality [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Reason is a support organ that slowly develops itself, ...and emancipates itself slowly to equal rights with the organic drives - so that reason (belief and knowledge) fights with the drives, as itself a new drive, very late come to preponderance.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Works (refs to 8 vol Colli and Montinari) [1885], 9/11[243]), quoted by John Richardson - Nietzsche's System 4.3.2 n55
     A reaction: A very powerful and fascinating idea. There is a silly post-modern tendency to think that Nietzsche denegrates and trivialises reason because of remarks like this, but he takes ranking the drives to be the supreme activity. I rank reason high.
I want to understand the Socratic idea that 'reason equals virtue equals happiness' [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: I seek to understand out of what idiosyncrasy that Socratic equation 'reason equals virtue equals happiness' derives.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 1.04)
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
What can be 'demonstrated' is of little worth [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: What can be 'demonstrated' is of little worth.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §431)
     A reaction: He admits that some things can be demonstrated, and that they have some worth. But demonstration may be a matter of coherence, so that anything can be demonstrated, by assuming a range of ideas as being beyond demonstration.