display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
4 ideas
10804 | Thoughts have a natural order, to which human thinking is drawn [Frege, by Yablo] |
Full Idea: Burge has argued that Frege's rationalism runs very deep. Frege holds that there is a natural order of thoughts to which human thinking is naturally drawn. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884]) by Stephen Yablo - Carving Content at the Joints § 8 | |
A reaction: [Yablo cites Burge 1984,1992,1998] What an intriguing idea. I always start from empiricist beginnings, but some aspects of rationalism just sieze you by the throat. |
9832 | Frege sees no 'intersubjective' category, between objective and subjective [Dummett on Frege] |
Full Idea: Frege left no place for a category of the intersubjective, intermediate between the wholly objective and the radically subjective. | |
From: comment on Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884]) by Michael Dummett - Frege philosophy of mathematics Ch.7 | |
A reaction: Interesting. More sophisticated accounts of language (with the Private Language Argument as background) hold out possibilities of objectivity arising from an articulate community. See Idea 95. |
8414 | Keep the psychological and subjective separate from the logical and objective [Frege] |
Full Idea: Always separate sharply the psychological from the logical, the subjective from the objective. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884], Intro p.x) | |
A reaction: This (with Ideas 7732 and 8415) is said to be the foundation of modern analytical philosophy. It contrasts with Husserl's 'Logical Investigations', which are the foundations of phenomenology. I think it is time someone challenged Frege here. |
7740 | There exists a realm, beyond objects and ideas, of non-spatio-temporal thoughts [Frege, by Weiner] |
Full Idea: There is, in addition to the external world of physical objects and the internal world of ideas, a third realm of non-spatio-temporal objective objects, among which are thoughts. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (The Thought: a Logical Enquiry [1918]) by Joan Weiner - Frege Ch.7 | |
A reaction: This seems to be Platonism, and, in particular, to give a Platonic existent status to propositions. Personally I believe in propositions, but as glimpses of how our brains actually work, not as mystical objects. |