Combining Philosophers

Ideas for John Cottingham, Gottlob Frege and John Hacker-Wright

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4 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 3. Pure Reason
Thoughts have a natural order, to which human thinking is drawn [Frege, by Yablo]
     Full Idea: Burge has argued that Frege's rationalism runs very deep. Frege holds that there is a natural order of thoughts to which human thinking is naturally drawn.
     From: report of Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884]) by Stephen Yablo - Carving Content at the Joints § 8
     A reaction: [Yablo cites Burge 1984,1992,1998] What an intriguing idea. I always start from empiricist beginnings, but some aspects of rationalism just sieze you by the throat.
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Frege sees no 'intersubjective' category, between objective and subjective [Dummett on Frege]
     Full Idea: Frege left no place for a category of the intersubjective, intermediate between the wholly objective and the radically subjective.
     From: comment on Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884]) by Michael Dummett - Frege philosophy of mathematics Ch.7
     A reaction: Interesting. More sophisticated accounts of language (with the Private Language Argument as background) hold out possibilities of objectivity arising from an articulate community. See Idea 95.
Keep the psychological and subjective separate from the logical and objective [Frege]
     Full Idea: Always separate sharply the psychological from the logical, the subjective from the objective.
     From: Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884], Intro p.x)
     A reaction: This (with Ideas 7732 and 8415) is said to be the foundation of modern analytical philosophy. It contrasts with Husserl's 'Logical Investigations', which are the foundations of phenomenology. I think it is time someone challenged Frege here.
There exists a realm, beyond objects and ideas, of non-spatio-temporal thoughts [Frege, by Weiner]
     Full Idea: There is, in addition to the external world of physical objects and the internal world of ideas, a third realm of non-spatio-temporal objective objects, among which are thoughts.
     From: report of Gottlob Frege (The Thought: a Logical Enquiry [1918]) by Joan Weiner - Frege Ch.7
     A reaction: This seems to be Platonism, and, in particular, to give a Platonic existent status to propositions. Personally I believe in propositions, but as glimpses of how our brains actually work, not as mystical objects.