Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Stephen Davies and Thomas Nagel

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5 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity

3248	Realism invites scepticism because it claims to be objective [Nagel]
	Full Idea: The search for objective knowledge, because of its commitment to realism, cannot refute scepticism and must proceed under its shadow, and scepticism is only a problem because of the realist claims of objectivity.
	From: Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], V.1)

20989	Views are objective if they don't rely on a person's character, social position or species [Nagel]
	Full Idea: A view or form of thought is more objective than another if it relies less on the specifics of the individual's makeup and position in the world, or on the character of the particular type of creature he is.
	From: Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], Intro)
	A reaction: Notice that this defines comparative objectivity, rather than an absolute. I take it that something must be entirely objective to qualify as a 'fact', and so anything about which there is a consensus that it is a fact can be taken as wholly objective.

22354	Things cause perceptions, properties have other effects, hence we reach a 'view from nowhere' [Nagel, by Reiss/Sprenger]
	Full Idea: First we realise that perceptions are caused by things, second we realise that properties have other effects (as well as causing perceptions), and third we conceive of a thing's true nature without perspectives. That is the 'view from nowhere'.
	From: report of Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], p.14) by Reiss,J/Spreger,J - Scientific Objectivity 2.1
	A reaction: [My summary of their summary] This is obviously an optimistic view. I''m not sure how he can justify three precise stages, given than animals probably jump straight to the third stage, and engage with the nature's of things.

2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions

20389	A definition of a thing gives all the requirements which add up to a guarantee of it [Davies,S]
	Full Idea: If we specify the 'necessary' conditions that are 'sufficient' for something's being an X, that is a combination of conditions such that all and only Xs meet them, which is the hallmark of a definition of X-hood.
	From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 2.1)
	A reaction: There are, of course, many other ways to define something, as shown in the 2.D Reason | Definition section of this database. This nicely summarises the classical view.

2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition

20391	Feminists warn that ideologies use timeless objective definitions as a tool of repression [Davies,S]
	Full Idea: According to the feminist critique, ideologies that operate as tools of political repression are falsely represented as definitions possessing a timeless, natural, asocial, universal objectivity.
	From: Stephen Davies (The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) [2016], 2.2)
	A reaction: I suppose this does not just apply to definitions, but to all expressions of ideologically repressive strategy. I'm trying to think of an example of a specifically feminist problem case. Davies doesn't cite anyone.