Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Melvin Fitting, Roger Scruton and Paul Thagard

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4 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
Coherence problems have positive and negative restraints; solutions maximise constraint satisfaction [Thagard]
     Full Idea: A coherence problem is a set of elements connected by positive and negative restraints, and a solution consists of partitioning the elements into two sets (accepted and rejected) in a way that maximises satisfaction of the constraints.
     From: Paul Thagard (Coherence: The Price is Right [2012], p.42)
     A reaction: I'm enthusiastic about this, as it begins to clarify the central activity of epistemology, which is the quest for best explanations.
Coherence is explanatory, deductive, conceptual, analogical, perceptual, and deliberative [Thagard]
     Full Idea: I propose that there are six main kinds of coherence: explanatory, deductive, conceptual, analogical, perceptual, and deliberative. ...Epistemic coherence is a combination of the first five kinds, and ethics adds the sixth.
     From: Paul Thagard (Coherence: The Price is Right [2012], p.43)
     A reaction: Wonderful. Someone is getting to grips with the concept of coherence, instead of just whingeing about how vague it is.
Explanatory coherence needs symmetry,explanation,analogy,data priority, contradiction,competition,acceptance [Thagard]
     Full Idea: Informally, a theory of explanatory coherence has the principles of symmetry, explanation, analogy, data priority, contradiction, competition and acceptance.
     From: Paul Thagard (Coherence: The Price is Right [2012], p.44)
     A reaction: [Thagard give a concise summary of his theory here] Again Thagard makes a wonderful contribution in an area where most thinkers are pessimistic about making any progress. His principles are very plausible.
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Do aesthetic reasons count as reasons, if they are rejectable without contradiction? [Scruton]
     Full Idea: The judgement of beauty makes a claim about its object, and can be supported by reasons. But the reasons do not compel the judgement and can be rejected without contradiction. So are they reasons or aren't they?
     From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 1)
     A reaction: I suspect that what he is really referring to is evidence rather than reasons.