Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Donald Davidson, Gilbert Harman and Richard Tuck
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15 ideas
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
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19307
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If there is a great cost to avoiding inconsistency, we learn to reason our way around it [Harman]
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19309
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Logic has little relevance to reasoning, except when logical conclusions are immediate [Harman]
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6950
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You can be rational with undetected or minor inconsistencies [Harman]
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19306
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It is a principle of reasoning not to clutter your mind with trivialities [Harman]
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3099
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Inference is never a conscious process [Harman]
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19304
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The rules of reasoning are not the rules of logic [Harman]
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2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
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3077
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Reasoning might be defined in terms of its functional role, which is to produce knowledge [Harman]
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19303
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Implication just accumulates conclusions, but inference may also revise our views [Harman]
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2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
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3969
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There are no ultimate standards of rationality, since we only assess others by our own standard [Davidson]
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8868
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Objective truth arises from interpersonal communication [Davidson]
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3972
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Truth and objectivity depend on a community of speakers to interpret what they mean [Davidson]
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2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
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12596
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Reasoning aims at increasing explanatory coherence [Harman]
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12599
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Reason conservatively: stick to your beliefs, and prefer reasoning that preserves most of them [Harman]
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6954
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A coherent conceptual scheme contains best explanations of most of your beliefs [Harman]
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2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
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3092
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If you believe that some of your beliefs are false, then at least one of your beliefs IS false [Harman]
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