Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Novalis, Anil Gupta and E.J. Lowe
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16 ideas
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
11223
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Definitions usually have a term, a 'definiendum' containing the term, and a defining 'definiens' [Gupta]
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11215
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Notable definitions have been of piety (Plato), God (Anselm), number (Frege), and truth (Tarski) [Gupta]
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2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
11225
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A definition needs to apply to the same object across possible worlds [Gupta]
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11227
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The 'revision theory' says that definitions are rules for improving output [Gupta]
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2. Reason / D. Definition / 3. Types of Definition
11224
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Traditional definitions are general identities, which are sentential and reductive [Gupta]
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11226
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Traditional definitions need: same category, mention of the term, and conservativeness and eliminability [Gupta]
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11221
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A definition can be 'extensionally', 'intensionally' or 'sense' adequate [Gupta]
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2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
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Chemists aim at real definition of things; lexicographers aim at nominal definition of usage [Gupta]
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2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
11216
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If definitions aim at different ideals, then defining essence is not a unitary activity [Gupta]
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16539
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A definition of a circle will show what it is, and show its generating principle [Lowe]
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16540
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Defining an ellipse by conic sections reveals necessities, but not the essence of an ellipse [Lowe]
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16548
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An essence is what an entity is, revealed by a real definition; this is not an entity in its own right [Lowe]
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2. Reason / D. Definition / 10. Stipulative Definition
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Stipulative definition assigns meaning to a term, ignoring prior meanings [Gupta]
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2. Reason / D. Definition / 11. Ostensive Definition
16549
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Simple things like 'red' can be given real ostensive definitions [Lowe]
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11220
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Ostensive definitions look simple, but are complex and barely explicable [Gupta]
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2. Reason / D. Definition / 12. Paraphrase
8262
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How can a theory of meaning show the ontological commitments of two paraphrases of one idea? [Lowe]
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