display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
3 ideas
9284 | Reasons are 'internal' if they give a person a motive to act, but 'external' otherwise [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: Someone has 'internal reasons' to act when the person has some motive which will be served or furthered by the action; if this turns out not to be so, the reason is false. Reasons are 'external' when there is no such condition. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Internal and External Reasons [1980], p.101) | |
A reaction: [compressed] An external example given is a family tradition of joining the army, if the person doesn't want to. Williams says (p.111) external reason statements are actually false, and a misapplication of the concept of a 'reason to act'. See Idea 8815. |
2174 | Responsibility involves cause, intention, state of mind, and response after the event [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: The four elements of any conception of responsibility are cause, intention, state of mind, and response after the event. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993], III - p.53) |
22455 | Many ethical theories neglect the power of regretting the ought not acted upon [Williams,B] |
Full Idea: It is a fundamental criticism of many ethical theories that their accounts of moral conflict and its resolution do not do justice to the facts of regret...: basically because they eliminate from the scene the ought that is not acted upon. | |
From: Bernard Williams (Ethical consistency [1965], p.175), quoted by Philippa Foot - Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma p.39 | |
A reaction: [p.175 in Problems of the Self] Williams seems to have initiated this idea. It doesn't matter much for Kantians and Utilitarians (any more than a wrong answer in maths), but it matters if character is the focus. The virtuous have regrets. |