display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
21 ideas
| 22515 | Choice results when deliberation brings together an opinion with an inclination [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Choice is neither simply wish nor opinion, but opinion together with inclination, whenever as a result of deliberation they are brought to a conclusion. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1227a04) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be the earliest appearance of the belief-plus-desire theory of action, which is often associated with Hume. A choice does not necessarily result from having the inclination and the appropriate opinion. Laziness! |
| 5247 | Prudence is mainly concerned with particulars, which is the sphere of human conduct [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Prudence ('phronesis') is not concerned with universals only; it must also take cognizance of particulars, because it is concerned with conduct, and conduct has its sphere in particular circumstances. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1141b14) | |
| A reaction: Note that 'phronesis' is partly concerned with universals, although it is crucial to Aristotle's theory that each particular situation is different, and so no rules can actually dictate moral action. |
| 80 | Virtue ensures that we have correct aims, and prudence that we have correct means of achieving them [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Virtue ensures the correctness of the end at which we aim, and prudence that of the means towards it. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1144a07) | |
| A reaction: I'm not wholly clear about how virtue identifies correct aims. Virtue finds the mean, but how? Prudence is busy with strategy. Theoretical reason stands back from the world. A gap in the theory? |
| 5249 | One cannot be prudent without being good [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: One cannot be prudent (have practical reason) without being good. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1144a33) | |
| A reaction: I suspect that for Aristotle this is more of a tautology than an observation. We might think of a very clever criminal as having 'phronesis' (practical reason), but Aristotle simply wouldn't, though he has no simple explanation for his view. |
| 82 | The one virtue of prudence carries with it the possession of all the other virtues [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The possession of the single virtue of prudence will carry with it the possession of them all. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1145a02) | |
| A reaction: Prudence is phronesis, of which I prefer the translation 'common sense', thought he scholars call it 'practical wisdom'. People can be sensible in one are, and stupid in another. |
| 22508 | Unlike in inanimate things, in animate things actions have more than one starting point [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: In inanimate things the starting-point is single, in animate things there is more than one; for inclination and reason are not always in harmony. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1224a24) | |
| A reaction: It is important that this seems to include non-human animals. We see animals avoid something which they desire, presumably because they detect a danger. They may be conflicting desires, but it is rational to prioritise dangers. |
| 22514 | The deliberative part of the soul discerns explanatory causes [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: That part of the soul is deliberative which is capable of discerning a cause: the reason for the sake of which - which is one of the causes - 'cause' being something because-of-which. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1226b26) | |
| A reaction: I take because-of-which to be the correct explanation. Since my model of practical reasoning is partly forensic detection, this seems right. Sherlock Holmes spots causes. |
| 73 | Practical intellect serves to arrive at the truth which corresponds to right appetite [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The function of practical intellect is to arrive at the truth that corresponds to right appetite. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1139a28) | |
| A reaction: And right appetite may well have to be educated by theoretical intellect. |
| 4371 | Seeing particulars as parts of larger wholes is to perceive their value [Achtenberg on Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: For Aristotle, practical perception is perception of particulars as parts of larger wholes, which involves the perception of their value (as in seeing my food as part of bodily health, and all action as part of a flourishing life). | |
| From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE]) by Deborah Achtenberg - Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics Intro | |
| A reaction: An appealing idea. Hume (who separates facts from values) would call it rubbish, but with the addition of a premiss like "life is good", this seems plausible and appealing. |
| 20212 | Practical reason is truth-attaining, and focused on actions good for human beings [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Practical reason [phronesis] is a truth-attaining intellectual quality concerned with doing, and with the things that are good for human beings. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1140b21) | |
| A reaction: [tr. Greenwood] That sounds suspiciously like wisdom to me. Or maybe wisdom also has a contemplative aspect. |
| 69 | We deliberate about means, not ends [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: We deliberate not about ends, but about means. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1112b12) | |
| A reaction: A young person choosing a career path probably ought to deliberate about ends, as well as means. Is he implying at ends are irrational? That sounds unlikely. |
| 67 | Bad people are just ignorant of what they ought to do [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Every bad man is ignorant of what he ought to do and refrain from doing. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1110b29) | |
| A reaction: This sounds more like the view on akrasia of Socrates than that of Aristotle. Aristotle thinks bad people can also know what is good, but be pulled away from it by strong desires. |
| 5218 | Some people are good at forming opinions, but bad at making moral choices [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It seems that the same people are not equally good at choosing the best actions and forming the best opinions; some are comparatively good at forming opinions, but through a moral defect fail to make the right choices. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1112a09) | |
| A reaction: It is not enough to say that they CAN be separate. What type of opinions? Wise actors rarely have stupid opinions, and the opinions of bad actors usually contain error. See Jane Austen. |
| 81 | For Socrates virtues are principles, involving knowledge, but we say they only imply the principle of practical reason [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Whereas Socrates thought that the virtues are principles (because they are forms of knowledge), we say they imply a principle (practical reason). | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1144b30) | |
| A reaction: It is hard to pin down how rational an Aristotelian virtue is supposed to be. Is a virtue a quasi-platonic vision of 'the good', but in each specific area, rather than in general? |
| 20042 | We assign the cause of someone's walking when we say why they are doing it [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Why is he going for a walk? We say 'to be healthy', and having said that we have assigned the cause. | |
| From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 194b33-5) | |
| A reaction: Stout gives this as the predecessor of Anscombe's account of intentions. The thought is that the explanation of the act is its purpose. Such teleology is more plausible than the Aristotelian teleology about non-human events. |
| 5267 | Our reasoned acts are held to be voluntary and our own doing [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is our reasoned acts that are held to be in the fullest sense voluntary and our own doing. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1169a01) | |
| A reaction: This seems to me crucial in morality. Morality concerns important decisions made by the core of a person. If we ask how 'core decisions' are known, their hallmark will be reasons, because reasons are the peak of human awareness. |
| 5213 | If you repent of an act done through ignorance, you acted involuntarily, not non-voluntarily [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: When a man repents of an act done through ignorance, he is considered to have acted involuntarily; but a man who does not repent of such an act is another case, so he may be said to have acted non-voluntarily. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1110b22) | |
| A reaction: It strikes me as crucial to virtue theory that how you acted could be partly decided by your attitude AFTER the event. There is a 'residue' (Hursthouse) to every action, of guilt, pride etc. 'Voluntary' evidently has internal/external components. |
| 22507 | An action is voluntary when it is accompanied by thought of some kind [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The voluntary consists in action accompanied by thought of some kind. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1224a06) | |
| A reaction: This is thought as opposed to inclination or choice. The controlled person [enkrateia] voluntarily acts against inclinations. The appropriate thought receives carefull analysis in NE 1109b30-1111b4. |
| 4384 | For Aristotle responsibility seems negative, in the absence of force or ignorance [Irwin on Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle seems to define responsibility negatively: I am responsible for an action if and only if I do it neither by force nor because of ignorance. | |
| From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1114b13) by Terence Irwin - Reason and Responsibility in Aristotle p.117 | |
| A reaction: Reminiscent of David Hume, suggesting that Aristotle may at heart be a determinist, because he lacks any positive notion of free will? |
| 23319 | We are responsible if our actions reflect our motivation [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| Full Idea: For Aristotle, for us to be responsible for what we do, our action has to somehow reflect our motivation. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1224a07) by Michael Frede - A Free Will 2 | |
| A reaction: This sounds like 'mens rea' in law - meaning to do the thing you did. But we can obviously be responsible for things through neglect, for example. |
| 5212 | A man should sooner die than do some dreadful things, no matter how cruel the death [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Presumably there are some things such that a man cannot be compelled to do them - that he must sooner die than do, though he suffer the most dreadful fate. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1110a27) | |
| A reaction: This is a central concept for virtue theory - that no possible 'utilitarian calculation' could allow a virtuous person to do some awful thing because of a cool assessment that it will eventually add up to increased happiness. |