display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
3 ideas
24108 | Actions are just a release of force. They seize on something, which becomes the purpose [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: What is the source of actions? For what purpose? …People do not act for happiness, utility or pleasure. Rather, a certain amount of force is released. Seizes on something on which it can vent itself. 'Goal' and 'purpose' are the means for this process. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1882-84 [1883], 7[077]) | |
A reaction: Surprised at how little Nietzsche is discussed in modern theoretical accounts of action. I'm not sure what the evolutionary value might be of a blind force that produces action before its purpose has been decided. Not convinced. What triggers the force? |
22501 | Nietzsche classified actions by the nature of the agent, not the nature of the act [Nietzsche, by Foot] |
Full Idea: Nietzsche thought profoundly mistaken a taxonomy that classified actions as the doing of this or that, insisting that the true nature of an action depended rather on the nature of the individual who did it. | |
From: report of Friedrich Nietzsche (Works (refs to 8 vol Colli and Montinari) [1885], 7) by Philippa Foot - Natural Goodness 7 | |
A reaction: This is more in the spirit of Aristotle than in the modern legalistic style. It seems to totally ignore consequences, which would puzzle victims or beneficiaries of the action. |
4411 | It is a delusion to separate the man from the deed, like the flash from the lightning [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Just as the popular mind separates the lightning from its flash and takes the latter for a 'action', so they separate strength from expressions of strength, but there is no such substratum; the deed is everything. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], I.§13) | |
A reaction: Of course, there is no reason why an analysis should not separate the doer and the deed (to explain, for example, a well-meaning fool), but it is a blunder to think of a human action as a merely physical event. |