Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Jerry A. Fodor, Scott Shalkowski and Thomas Hobbes

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4 ideas

20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
The will is just the last appetite before action [Hobbes]
     Full Idea: In deliberation, the last appetite or aversion immediately adhering to the action, or to the omission thereof, is that we call the Will.
     From: Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651], 1.06)
     A reaction: I share his caution about 'the will', but his observation strikes me as inaccurate. When I drink, my 'will' is not my thirst. I take the will to be a feature of my reason. I gave my thirst permission to indulge itself. The will is practical reason?
It is an error that reason should control the passions, which give right guidance on their own [Hobbes, by Tuck]
     Full Idea: Hobbes (and Descartes, and many contemporaries) argued that the traditional idea that reason should control the passions was an error, and that (properly understood) our emotions would guide us in the right direction.
     From: report of Thomas Hobbes (The Elements of Law [1640]) by Richard Tuck - Hobbes Ch.2
     A reaction: I'm an intellectualist on this one. It strikes me as rather naïve and romantic to think that unthinking emotion could ever consistently approach what is right. A recipe for disaster.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
Before you can plan action, you must decide on the truth of your estimate of success [Fodor]
     Full Idea: You can't think a plan of action unless you can think how the world would be if the action were to succeed; and thinking the world will be such and such if all goes well is thinking the kind of thing that can be true or false.
     From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.1)
     A reaction: This is part of Fodor's attack on the pragmatic view of concepts (that they should be fully understood in terms of action, rather than of thought). I take Fodor to be blatantly correct. This is counterfactual thinking.
Reason is usually general, but deliberation is of particulars [Hobbes]
     Full Idea: Reasoning is in general words, but deliberation for the most part is of particulars.
     From: Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651], 1.06)