Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Aristotle, Wilson,G/Schpall,S and John Duns Scotus

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52 ideas

20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
20014 Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
20019 Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall]
20021 Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
4380 Not all actions aim at some good; akratic actions, for example, do not [Burnyeat on Aristotle]
20022 To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall]
20023 If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall]
20025 We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
20031 On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / d. Group intentions
20028 Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall]
20027 If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
23320 Choice is not explained by the will, but by the operation of reason when it judges what is good [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
5211 An action is voluntary if the limb movements originate in the agent [Aristotle]
5221 Deliberation ends when the starting-point of an action is traced back to the dominant part of the self [Aristotle]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
4383 Aristotle seems not to explain why the better syllogism is overcome in akratic actions [Burnyeat on Aristotle]
68 The akrates acts from desire not choice, and the enkrates acts from choice not desire [Aristotle]
4318 Virtue is right reason and feeling and action. Akrasia and enkrateia are lower levels of action. [Aristotle, by Cottingham]
4372 Akrasia merely neglects or misunderstands knowledge, rather than opposing it [Achtenberg on Aristotle]
5254 Some people explain akrasia by saying only opinion is present, not knowledge [Aristotle]
5255 A person may act against one part of his knowledge, if he knows both universal and particular [Aristotle]
23317 Aristotle sees akrasia as acting against what is chosen, not against reason [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
23318 Akrasia is explained by past mental failures, not by a specific choice [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
22574 A community can lack self-control [Aristotle]
5257 Licentious people feel no regret, but weak-willed people are capable of repentance [Aristotle]
23918 Akrasia is the clash of two feelings - goodness and pleasure [Aristotle]
24060 Self-controlled follow understanding, when it is opposed to desires [Aristotle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / a. Acting on beliefs
22515 Choice results when deliberation brings together an opinion with an inclination [Aristotle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / b. Action cognitivism
20017 Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20018 Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall]
20016 Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
73 Practical intellect serves to arrive at the truth which corresponds to right appetite [Aristotle]
4371 Seeing particulars as parts of larger wholes is to perceive their value [Achtenberg on Aristotle]
69 We deliberate about means, not ends [Aristotle]
5247 Prudence is mainly concerned with particulars, which is the sphere of human conduct [Aristotle]
80 Virtue ensures that we have correct aims, and prudence that we have correct means of achieving them [Aristotle]
82 The one virtue of prudence carries with it the possession of all the other virtues [Aristotle]
22508 Unlike in inanimate things, in animate things actions have more than one starting point [Aristotle]
22514 The deliberative part of the soul discerns explanatory causes [Aristotle]
20212 Practical reason is truth-attaining, and focused on actions good for human beings [Aristotle]
5249 One cannot be prudent without being good [Aristotle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
67 Bad people are just ignorant of what they ought to do [Aristotle]
5218 Some people are good at forming opinions, but bad at making moral choices [Aristotle]
81 For Socrates virtues are principles, involving knowledge, but we say they only imply the principle of practical reason [Aristotle]
20012 Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
5267 Our reasoned acts are held to be voluntary and our own doing [Aristotle]
20013 It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall]
20029 Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall]
20042 We assign the cause of someone's walking when we say why they are doing it [Aristotle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
5213 If you repent of an act done through ignorance, you acted involuntarily, not non-voluntarily [Aristotle]
22507 An action is voluntary when it is accompanied by thought of some kind [Aristotle]
4384 For Aristotle responsibility seems negative, in the absence of force or ignorance [Irwin on Aristotle]
23319 We are responsible if our actions reflect our motivation [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / a. Dilemmas
5212 A man should sooner die than do some dreadful things, no matter how cruel the death [Aristotle]