Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Michael Burke, Frances A. Yates and Rowland Stout
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16 ideas
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
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20044
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The rationalistic approach says actions are intentional when subject to justification [Stout,R]
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20039
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The causal theory says that actions are intentional when intention (or belief-desire) causes the act [Stout,R]
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20047
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Deciding what to do usually involves consulting the world, not our own minds [Stout,R]
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20065
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Should we study intentions in their own right, or only as part of intentional action? [Stout,R]
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20067
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You can have incompatible desires, but your intentions really ought to be consistent [Stout,R]
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20078
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The normativity of intentions would be obvious if they were internal promises [Stout,R]
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20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / b. Types of intention
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20036
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Intentional agency is seen in internal precursors of action, and in external reasons for the act [Stout,R]
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20066
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Speech needs sustained intentions, but not prior intentions [Stout,R]
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20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / d. Group intentions
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20073
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Bratman has to treat shared intentions as interrelated individual intentions [Stout,R]
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20069
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A request to pass the salt shares an intention that the request be passed on [Stout,R]
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20070
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An individual cannot express the intention that a group do something like moving a piano [Stout,R]
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20071
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An intention is a goal to which behaviour is adapted, for an individual or for a group [Stout,R]
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20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / b. Volitionism
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20038
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If the action of walking is just an act of will, then movement of the legs seems irrelevant [Stout,R]
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20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
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20050
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Most philosophers see causation as by an event or state in the agent, rather than the whole agent [Stout,R]
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20052
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If you don't mention an agent, you aren't talking about action [Stout,R]
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20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
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20077
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If you can judge one act as best, then do another, this supports an inward-looking view of agency [Stout,R]
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