Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Hastings Rashdall, William Poundstone and Hilary Putnam

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2 ideas

22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
The word 'inconsiderate' nicely shows the blurring of facts and values [Putnam]
     Full Idea: The use of the word 'inconsiderate' seems to me a very fine example of the way in which the fact/value distinction is hopelessly fuzzy in the real world and in the real language.
     From: Hilary Putnam (Reason, Truth and History [1981])
     A reaction: Interesting, but not much of an argument. What would Nietzsche say? Was Agamemnon morally deficient because we might think him 'inconsiderate'?
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / e. Means and ends
All moral judgements ultimately concern the value of ends [Rashdall]
     Full Idea: All moral judgements are ultimately judgements as to the value of ends.
     From: Hastings Rashdall (Theory of Good and Evil [1907], VII.I)
     A reaction: I am increasingly struck by this, especially when observing that it is the great gap in Kant's theory. For some odd reason, he gives being rational the highest possible value. Why? Nietzsche is good on this. 'Eudaimonia' seems a good start, to me.