display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
82 ideas
| 45 | We aim not to identify goodness, but to be good [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: We are studying not to know what goodness is, but how to become good men. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1103b27) | |
| A reaction: How can a philosopher not want to know what goodness is? Can you fail to be good if you know what goodness is? Can you be a good man without understanding goodness? |
| 5153 | There is no fixed art of good conduct, and each situation is different, as in navigation [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Questions of conduct do not fall under any art or professional tradition, but the agents are compelled at every step to think out for themselves what the circumstances demand, just as happens in the arts of medicine and navigation. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1104a08) | |
| A reaction: It is interesting that some areas of medicine, and a lot of navigation, have become much more precise in modern times. His thought sounds pessimistic, but it is a lynchpin of virtue theory. 'Have the right disposition, then attend to the details'. |
| 46 | We must take for granted that we should act according to right principle [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: That we should act according to the right principle is common ground and may be assumed as a basis for discussion. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1103b31) | |
| A reaction: Hume grumbles that we can't prove values from facts, but Aristotle that is an absurd aspiration. His 'Ethics' is simply a handbook for people who wish to be good human beings. |
| 22512 | Acts are voluntary if done knowingly, by the agent, and in his power to avoid it [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Whatever a man does - not in ignorance, and through his own agency - when it is in his power not to do it, must be voluntary, and that is what voluntary is. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1225b08) | |
| A reaction: This is the conclusion of the Eudemian discussion of responsibility. This is a definition by necessary and sufficient conditions. How can you be sure that something is in your power not to do? |
| 5858 | Men are physically prime at thirty-five, and mentally prime at forty-nine [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The body is in its prime from the ages of thirty to thirty-five, and the soul around the age of forty-nine. | |
| From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1390b09) | |
| A reaction: Wonderfully specific! It is important that Aristotle is interested in these questions. The good for man follows the path laid out by nature, in which a man rises to his highest good in maturity, and then declines from it into old age. |
| 5134 | Perhaps we get a better account of happiness as the good for man if we know his function [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Just saying that man's happiness is the supreme good seems a platitude, and some more distinctive account of it is still required. This might perhaps be achieved by grasping what is the function of man. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1097b22) | |
| A reaction: Notice the 'perhaps', right at the heart of Aristotle's theory. The connection between happiness and function is not obvious. The connection is, of course, areté (virtue/excellence), which is known by the function, and generates the happiness. |
| 31 | If bodily organs have functions, presumably the whole person has one [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: As we see that eye, hand and foot have some function, should we not assume a human being has a function over and above these? | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1097b30) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be a case of the fallacy of composition - you can't infer the function of the whole from the function of the parts. This error by the great man smacks of desperation, but it leaves untouched his general claim that man has a function. |
| 5231 | To eat vast amounts is unnatural, since natural desire is to replenish the deficiency [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: To eat or drink indiscriminately until one is full to bursting is to exceed in quantity one's natural limit, since the natural desire is merely a replenishment of the deficiency. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1118b21) | |
| A reaction: This illustrates nicely Aristotle's need for a concept of 'unnatural' to support his theory of virtues. A glutton could claim to have an enormous deficiency, and to counter that we must say that being overweight is unnatural. Etc. |
| 22509 | What is natural for us is either there at birth, or appears by normal processes [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: By these marks we distinguish what comes naturally: everything that is there straightaway as soon as something comes to be, and all that occurs to us if growth is allowed to proceed normally - such as greying hair, ageing, and the like. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1224b32) | |
| A reaction: The word 'normal' has to do a lot of work here. Presumably jaundice in a neonate is not included. Or later hereditary diseases. |
| 6559 | Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal [Aristotle, by Fogelin] |
| Full Idea: To the best of my knowledge (and somewhat to my surprise), Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal; however, he all but says it. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.1 | |
| A reaction: When I read this I thought that this database would prove Fogelin wrong, but it actually supports him, as I can't find it in Aristotle either. Descartes refers to it in Med.Two. In Idea 5133 Aristotle does say that man is a 'social being'. But 22586! |
| 5234 | For the great-souled man it is sometimes better to be dead [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: For the magnanimous or great-souled man there are some circumstances in which it is not worth living. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1124b08) | |
| A reaction: He is not talking of suicide here, but of risking one's life. This seems to be a hallmark of the normally virtuous person, as well as of someone exceptional. Most people would agree with this, but for Aristotle it is a central issue. |
| 5855 | We all feel universal right and wrong, independent of any community or contracts [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: There is something of which we all have an inkling, being a naturally universal right and wrong, even if there should be no community between the parties or contract. | |
| From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1373b07) | |
| A reaction: This is the strongest assertion I know of in Aristotle of an absolute moral standard, independent of natural function. It makes Aristotle an intuitionist, and is strikingly opposed to contracts as the most basic aspect of morality. |
| 5075 | Aristotle said there are two levels of virtue - the conventional and the intellectual [Taylor,R on Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Conventional virtue was not dismissed by Aristotle, as it had been by some of the Socratic schools, nor seen as the substance of virtue, as it was by Protagoras. Instead Aristotle distinguished two levels of virtue - the conventional and the intellectual. | |
| From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE]) by Richard Taylor - Virtue Ethics: an Introduction Ch.9 | |
| A reaction: On balance I think Taylor is wrong about this. Aristotle is never going to concede a fully relativist view of social morality. Some things are 'just wrong', and the basis is the function of man as a political animal. Good citizenship is not conventional. |
| 21 | Moral acts are so varied that they must be convention, not nature [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Morally fine and just conduct…involves so much difference and variety that they are widely believed to be such only by convention and not by nature. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1094b14) | |
| A reaction: Relativists about morality do typically point to the very diverse standards in different cultures. Critics can point to the huge similarities, when basic human issues are concerned. |
| 2807 | Some say slavery is unnatural and created by convention, and is therefore forced, and unjust [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Some say the distinction between slave and free is one of convention only, and in nature there is no difference, so that this form of rule is based on force and is therefore not just. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253b20) | |
| A reaction: Note that Aristotle gives good expression to the main view opposed to his own. History has clearly proved Aristotle wrong, and the present idea to be correct. Ditto the subjugation of women. |
| 4370 | For Aristotle 'good' means purpose, and value is real but relational [Achtenberg on Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: In my view, 'good' for Aristotle means 'telos', and value is real, but relational. | |
| From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE]) by Deborah Achtenberg - Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics Intro | |
| A reaction: Interesting. Hence Aristotle is pursuing a naturalist project in ethics, since he connects purpose to function, which is natural and self-evident. |
| 18227 | We desire final things just for themselves, and not for the sake of something else [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: We call final without qualification that which is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1097a30), quoted by Christine M. Korsgaard - Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value 8 'Finality' | |
| A reaction: This is such a simple and neat test for dividing what you value into two groups. You end up with things like art, philosophy, gardening, sipping wine, looking at beautiful views, talking to friends. |
| 4381 | How can an action be intrinsically good if it is a means to 'eudaimonia'? [Ackrill on Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: A question for Aristotle is, how can an action be good in itself if it is valued as a means to 'eudaimonia'? | |
| From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1101a15) by J.L. Ackrill - Aristotle on Action p.93 | |
| A reaction: A good question, but one which shouldn't trouble Aristotle. There is no short cut to eudaimonia (e.g. a pill); it is a state of accumulated good actions. |
| 18230 | No one would choose life just for activities not done for their own sake [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If we put together all the things that are ....not done or undergone for their own sake ...no one would choose, in order to have them, to be alive rather than not. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1215), quoted by Christine M. Korsgaard - Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value 8 'Finality' | |
| A reaction: Debatable. Roughly his question is whether you would rather be dead than be a slave, since slaves work for means, but have no ends. Aristotle would rather die, but those who surrendered in ancient battles preferred slavery. |
| 398 | Each thing that has a function is for the sake of that function [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Each thing that has a function is for the sake of that function. | |
| From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 286a08) | |
| A reaction: This is the central idea of Aristotle's Ethics. Did it originate with Plato, or Socrates, the young pupil Aristotle? I suspect the strong influence of Aristotle on later Plato. A major idea. Functions link the facts to life. |
| 15772 | A thing's active function is its end [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: A thing's active function is its end. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1050a16) | |
| A reaction: This sort of remark is the basis of modern teleological functionalism about the mind. I think that is misguided. Don't define things by their function. They have functions because of intrinsic character. |
| 33 | Each named function has a distinctive excellence attached to it [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: An individual distinctive excellence is attached to the name of the function (e.g. a good 'harpist'). | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1098a09) | |
| A reaction: This is the core idea of Aristotle's metaethics. It seems hard to deny that a function implies the values of success and failure. The debate is likely to focus on the exact meaning of 'distinctive'. |
| 23909 | Wearing a shoe is its intrinsic use, and selling it (as a shoe) is its coincidental use [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: There is intrinsic use of a possession, such as of a shoe or a cloak, and its coincidental use - not of course when using a shoe as a weight, but as, for example, selling it or hiring it out (for then a shoe is used as a shoe). | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1231b37) | |
| A reaction: This seems to need a third label, for using the shoe as a weight. 'Inessential use' perhaps, since the intrinsic use points towards the essential nature or function of the shoe. |
| 5154 | Excess and deficiency are bad for virtue, just as they are for bodily health [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Excessive and insufficient exercise or food destroy one's strength or health, whereas the right quantity produces, increases and preserves them. It is the same with temperance, courage and the other virtues. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1104a15) | |
| A reaction: An example of Aristotle's philosophy originating in his biological background. This appears to be true of health, but he notes exceptions in morality. Adultery has no mean. In health a middle way is needed, but in morality it is what is 'appropriate'. |
| 5268 | Disreputable pleasures are only pleasant to persons with diseased perception [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: One may argue that disreputable pleasures are not pleasant; they may be pleasant to persons of unhealthy disposition, just as things may seem sweet or bitter or white to persons with unhealthy taste or vision. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1173b20) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle's analogy gives quite good support for what seems a rather implausible view. Bentham disagrees. It certainly seems odd to deny that a sadist is obtaining pleasure. Surely that is what we object to? Is pleasure a value? |
| 5870 | Everything seeks, not a single good, but its own separate good [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is not true that everything that there is seeks some single good: each thing has an inclination for its own good, the eye for sight, the body for health, and so on. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1218a30) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle's pluralism. Elsewhere this pluralism arises from his function argument - that the good of each thing is the successful fulfilment of its function, which is different for each thing. This is basic to virtue theory, and has my approval. |
| 5229 | The more virtuous and happy a person is, the worse the prospect becomes of ending life [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The more completely a man possesses virtue, and the happier he is, the more he will be distressed at the thought of death, for to such a man life is supremely worth living. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1117b11) | |
| A reaction: Virtuous people are also, of course, brave. There is a horrible logic which says that you try to be less happy as death becomes more probable. Maybe happy people should pretend they are immortal. |
| 90 | All altruism is an extension of self-love [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: All friendly feelings for others are extensions of a man's feelings for himself. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1168b06) | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure what his evidence is for this. The love of parents for their children doesn't seem to be based on self-love. |
| 22582 | Spirit [thumos] is the capacity by which we love [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Spirit [thumos] is what produces friendliness [philetikon], since it is the capacity of the soul by which we love [philoumen]. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1327b39) | |
| A reaction: This is the same 'spirit' which Plato adds to reason and emotion for this three-part soul. There it seems more to denote fighting ability. Aristotle says it produces both fierceness and love. 'For the man de sword, for the woman de kiss'. |
| 5262 | Only lovable things are loved, and they must be good, or pleasant, or useful [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is generally accepted that not everything is loved, but only what is lovable; and that this is either good, or pleasant, or useful. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1155b16) | |
| A reaction: It needs the great analyst himself to explain to us the ingredients of love. He, of course, goes on to say that good things are the most lovable. It is hard to disagree. |
| 5263 | Most people want to be loved rather than to love, because they desire honour [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Most people seem to want to be loved rather than to love, the reason being their desire for honour. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1159a13) | |
| A reaction: The footnote says 'honour' here is 'esteem'. In other words, wanting to be loved is a type of vanity, which sounds right. Most people would like being loved from afar, by a person who could do nothing to benefit or please them. |
| 2689 | Good people enjoy virtuous action, just as musicians enjoy beautiful melodies [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The good man, qua good, takes pleasure in morally virtuous actions and dislikes vicious ones, just as a musician enjoys beautiful melodies and is pained by bad ones. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1170a09) | |
| A reaction: This is the best illustration of the Greek love of 'fine' [kalon] actions. 'That was a beautiful thing you just did'. |
| 101 | Slaves can't be happy, because they lack freedom [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Nobody attributes happiness to a slave, unless he also attributes to him a life of his own. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1177a08) | |
| A reaction: Give them freedom then! In 'Politics' he allows a degree of friendship between masters and slaves, and recognises that not all slaves are stupid. |
| 5142 | Oxen, horses and children cannot be happy, because they cannot perform fine deeds [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: We do not speak of an ox or a horse as happy, because none of them can take part in fine deeds; similarly, no child is happy, because its age debars it as yet from such activities. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1099b32) | |
| A reaction: This is a place where 'happy' is not a very good translation for 'eudaimon', as we universally acknowledge a 'happy childhood'. We can have a 'successful' life, but not a successful childhood. I'm not convinced that even Greeks understood 'eudaimonia'. |
| 5243 | The best people exercise their virtue towards others, rather than to themselves [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The best person is not the one who exercises his virtue towards himself but the one who exercises it towards another, because this is a difficult task. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1130a07) | |
| A reaction: This is an importance counterbalance to the view that Greeks are concerned with self-development, and we are concerned with altruism. Above all, Aristotle wants us to be good citizens, and this implies a great deal of altruism. |
| 92 | Self-love benefits ourselves, and also helps others [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is right for the good man to be self-loving, because then he will both be benefited himself by performing fine actions, and also help others. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1169a12) | |
| A reaction: This is the simple and correct defence of self-love. If everyone develops their own character and abilities, we all benefit. Selfishness is the excess, not the mean. |
| 2810 | Selfishness is wrong not because it is self-love, but because it is excessive [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Selfishness is condemned, and justly, but selfishness is not simply to be fond of oneself, but to be excessively fond. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1263b03) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle is one of the main defendents of the idea that self-concern is an important part of morality. Stay fit! Improve your character! The mean between self-hatred and narcissism. |
| 3559 | For Aristotle, true self-love is love of the higher parts of one's soul [Aristotle, by Annas] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle thinks that those who think self-love is bad are identifying the self with the lower, irrational parts of the soul. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE]) by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness 12.1 | |
| A reaction: That seems to imply love of (and developmen of) one's intellect, but surely the less bookish person can develop their social virtues in a self-loving way? |
| 629 | Is the good a purpose, a source of movement, or a pure form? [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The good is a principle for all things, and is so in the very highest degree, but in what way? As a purpose, as a source of movement, or as a form? | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1075a32) | |
| A reaction: I tend to think of it as an 'ideal', whatever that is, and hence an inspiration, but a rather vague one. Beauty, goodness and truth. Surely not a source of movement? |
| 5128 | Each category of existence has its own good, so one Good cannot unite them [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Things are called good in as many senses as they are said to exist (e.g. substance, quality, quantity, relation, place, time); clearly, then, there cannot be a single universal common to all cases. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1096a23) | |
| A reaction: It doesn't follow that because you can divide the substratum, that therefore the superstructure lacks unity. One tree has many roots. We must ask whether a good substance and a good quantity have anything in common. |
| 5129 | There should be one science of the one Good, but there are many overlapping sciences [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Of things that come under one Idea there is one single science, so there should be some one science of all good things; but in fact there are more than one science even of those that fall under one category (e.g. opportunity in medicine and in war). | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1096a27) | |
| A reaction: The reply might be that there are many sciences because humans are confused. A truly wise person would see that the science of opportunity is the same in medicine and war. If the good was pleasure, or the glory of God, this would be obvious. |
| 20 | The good is 'that at which all things aim' [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The Good has rightly been defined as 'that at which all things aim'. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1094a02) | |
| A reaction: So it is logically impossible to aim at evil? Maybe in practice people always aim for what they take to be good, but it must be possible to deliberately do evil, just to prove a point. |
| 5110 | Goodness is when a thing (such as a circle) is complete, and conforms with its nature [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Goodness is a kind of completion: it is when something becomes as good as it may be that we say that it is complete, because that is when it pre-eminently conforms with its nature. A circle is complete when it is as good a circle as there could be. | |
| From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 246a12) | |
| A reaction: This, in turn, is said by Aristotle to result from the telos (purpose) of the thing. This won't eliminate the problem of relativism, unless we say that something cannot have an evil 'nature'. Was the Black Death good, by this definition? |
| 5131 | Intelligence and sight, and some pleasures and honours, are candidates for being good in themselves [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: What sort of things can one posit as good in themselves? Everything that is pursued even when considered in isolation - intelligence, for example, and sight, and some pleasures and honours? | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1096b15) | |
| A reaction: He means good-for-man, of course. If only 'some' pleasures are good, that implies a further good which is used to judge the pleasures. For Aristotle what is 'fine' (kalon) is the ultimate self-evident good. |
| 5135 | Goods are external, of the soul, and of the body; those of the soul (such as action) come first [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Goods have been classified (by Plato) under three heads, as external, or of the soul, or of the body; of these we say that goods of the soul are good in the strictest and fullest sense, and we rank actions as goods of the soul. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1098b13) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle is famous (or notorious) for allowing external goods in his theory, but it is important that he always makes them subordinate to the central goods. Wealth and glamour could never compensate for vice. |
| 23 | The masses believe, not unreasonably, that the good is pleasure [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The masses…seem - not unreasonably - to believe that the Good or happiness is pleasure. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1095b15) | |
| A reaction: Since Aristotle seems to see the pursuit of understanding, through various types of philosophy, as the supreme good, then this is 'understandable' because the masses lack the education for such a thing. |
| 5269 | Pleasure is not the Good, and not every pleasure is desirable [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is clear, then, that pleasure is not the Good, and that not every pleasure is desirable. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1174a08) | |
| A reaction: This is the culmination of a length discussion. Despite all of Aristotle's efforts, it may well be impossible to demonstrate that pleasure is not the Good. All the rivals, such as knowledge, intelligence, sight, excellence etc. give great pleasure. |
| 109 | Clearly perfect conduct will involve both good intention and good action [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is disputed whether the intentions or the actions have greater importance; …clearly the perfection of conduct will involve both. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1178a32) | |
| A reaction: This seems right, so choosing one or the other as prior seems misguided. What to make of attempted murder? What of moral luck? |
| 5877 | We judge people from their deeds because we cannot see their choices (which matter more) [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is because it is not easy to discern what sort of choice it is that we are forced to judge from the deeds what sort of person someone is; the activity is more worth having, but the choice is commended more. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1228a15) | |
| A reaction: This shows why Aristotle is the most important opponent of consequentialism. It is hard to see how one could praise a self-interested deed simply because it benefited others. Greed is never good. |
| 22555 | The function of good men is to confer benefits [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Conferring benefits is just what it is the function of good men to do. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1286b10) | |
| A reaction: Kant cannot ignore consequences (when assessing the maxim), and the great virtue theorist can't ignore them when judging virtuous behaviour. |
| 26 | Wealth is not the good, because it is only a means [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Wealth is obviously not the good we are seeking, because it serves only as a means. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1096a06) | |
| A reaction: So what are we to say to someone who considers wealth to be an end? Someone who has no desire to spend their horde. |
| 5136 | Happiness seems to involve virtue, or practical reason, or wisdom, or pleasure, or external goods [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Candidates for the required constituents of happiness are said to be virtue, or practical reason, or wisdom; others say it is these with the addition of pleasure, and others include favourable external conditions. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1098b21) | |
| A reaction: Characteristic of Aristotle to start from what both ordinary people and philosophers have previously said. By the end of his book (remarkably) wisdom is the only one of these which is excluded from normal human happiness. Wisdom transcends life. |
| 5868 | Horses, birds and fish are not happy, lacking a divine aspect to their natures [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: No horse or bird or fish is happy, nor any other thing that there is which does not have a share by its nature in the divine. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1217a26) | |
| A reaction: Pet owners will all feel their beloved companions have been insulted, but I agree with this. 'Happy' does not here mean 'in a state of pleasure'. A fully successful bird does little more than the four f's (feed, fornicate, flee, fight). |
| 25 | You can be good while asleep, or passive, or in pain [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The possession of goodness is thought to be compatible with being asleep, or…with inactivity, or…with atrocious suffering. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1096a02) | |
| A reaction: This helps to distinguish eudaimonia from the pleasant view of happiness. Pain probably annuls most immediate happiness, but has little to do with long-term flourishing. |
| 18673 | Eudaimonia is said to only have final value, where reason and virtue are also useful [Aristotle, by Orsi] |
| Full Idea: For Aristotle, what sets eudaimonia apart from things like reason and virtue is that it is exclusively finally valuable; ...reason and virtue are valuable also for contributing to other things, such as happiness. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE]) by Francesco Orsi - Value Theory 2.2 | |
| A reaction: This makes it sound as if eudaimonia is a super-value, and superior to virtue, but I don't think that is right. Eudaimonia just seems to be success in the areas that matter. |
| 5127 | Does Aristotle say eudaimonia is the aim, or that it ought to be? [McDowell on Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: We can distinguish at least two possible interpretations of Aristotle's thesis that eudaimonia is the chief good: either eudaimonia is that for the sake of which all action IS undertaken, or that for which all action OUGHT to be undertaken. | |
| From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1097b22) by John McDowell - Role of Eudaimonia in Aristotle's Ethics §1 | |
| A reaction: It seems to me Aristotle is describing how people DO behave (they all want ot flourish), and then goes on to describe how they OUGHT to behave to achieve the end they all want. His theory does not describe convention, which mostly concerns pleasure. |
| 5143 | Some good and evil can happen to the dead, just as the living may be unaware of a disaster [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is popularly believed that some good and evil, such as honours, or disasters of children, can happen to a dead man, inasmuch as they can happen to a live one without his being aware of them. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1100a17) | |
| A reaction: This suggests 'internalist' and 'externalist' accounts of happiness, with eudaimonia being the externalist view. If an architect designs a spectacular building, and it collapses the day after they die, that has to be a disaster for the architect. |
| 2681 | Aristotle is unsure about eudaimonia because he is unsure what people are [Nagel on Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle shows an indecision between an intellectualist and a comprehensive account of eudaimonia. …It is because he is not sure who we are that he finds it difficult to say unequivocally in what our eudaimonia consists. | |
| From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE]) by Thomas Nagel - Aristotle on Eudaimonia p.8 | |
| A reaction: Aristotle is quite right to be unsure about what people are, given the fluidity of human nature, in comparison with other animals. He needs a stable core to human nature, and I think that exists. |
| 5132 | Goods like pleasure are chosen partly for happiness, but happiness is chosen just for itself [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Happiness more than anything else is thought to be a final end without qualification, because we always choose it for itself, and not for any other reason. Pleasure, intelligence and good qualities generally we choose partly for the sake of our happiness. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1097a32) | |
| A reaction: The obvious reply is that happiness might be chosen because it gives us pleasure. Imagine if a sense of happiness resulted in an instant feeling of guilt. If we could ONLY have intelligence, we would choose that just for itself. |
| 30 | Happiness is perfect and self-sufficient, the end of all action [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Happiness is found to be something perfect and self-sufficient, being the end to which our actions are directed. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1097b21) | |
| A reaction: This will be eudaimonia, so while this sounds like an announcement of the secret of life, eudaimonia is only really a placeholder for things going very well, in some way or other. |
| 5850 | Happiness is composed of a catalogue of internal and external benefits [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The elements of happiness are: gentle birth, many virtuous friends, wealth, creditable and extensive offspring, a comfortable old age; also health, beauty, strength, size and competitiveness, reputation, status, luck and the virtues. | |
| From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1360b18) | |
| A reaction: This is Aristotle's pluralism, and his commitment to 'external goods' (rather than the inner good of pure virtue, which the Stoics preferred). 'Gentle birth' might turn out to mean good upbringing and education. Who was the most 'beautiful' philosopher? |
| 39 | Happiness needs total goodness and a complete life [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Happiness demands not only complete goodness but a complete life (e.g. final misfortune of King Priam of Troy). | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1100a05) | |
| A reaction: Eudaimonia may be ruined if a serious defect of character emerges near the end, but surely not if they are merely the victim of misfortune? |
| 5139 | If happiness can be achieved by study and effort, then it is open to anyone who is not corrupt [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If happiness is not a divine gift, it will be something widely shared; for it can attach, through some form of study or application, to anyone who is not handicapped by some incapacity for goodness. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1099b17) | |
| A reaction: This is a non-elitist view, even though he is saying that study and effort are needed. The explanation of this is that happiness is not achieved through wisdom, but through practical reason (phronesis), which does not require advanced education. |
| 5144 | Happiness is activity in accordance with complete virtue, for a whole life, with adequate external goods [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: We define the happy man as 'one who is active in accordance with complete virtue, and who is adequately furnished with external goods, and that not for some unspecified period but throughout a complete life'. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1101a13) | |
| A reaction: The only plausible objection to this definition is that it sounds worthy but dull. There is some exciting, romantic, Nietzschean ingredient missing - but the happy man will routinely perform 'fine deeds', and these may involve novelty and boldness. |
| 5865 | Happiness involves three things, of which the greatest is either wisdom, virtue, or pleasure [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: To be happy, and to live the fine and divinely-happy life, would seem to reside in three things above all, ..for some say that wisdom is the greatest good, others virtue, others pleasure. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1214a30) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle is well-known for his pluralist answer to this question: virtue is crucial, wisdom is perhaps the greatest of the virtues, and pleasure improves everything in life. |
| 106 | The best life is that of the intellect, since that is in the fullest sense the man [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The best and most pleasant life is the life of the intellect, since the intellect is in the fullest sense the man. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1178a08) | |
| A reaction: He would say that, wouldn't he? He's Aristotle, after all. The question of what is a human's essential nature is the nub of the Aristotelian project. |
| 100 | The happy life is in accordance with goodness, which implies seriousness [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The happy life seems to be lived in accordance with goodness, and such a life implies seriousness. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1177a03) | |
| A reaction: There are far more jokes in the talk of Socrates than in the writings of Aristotle. Presumably seriousness is required by anything which turns out to be difficult. |
| 4376 | Pleasure and pain are perceptions of things as good or bad [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: To experience pleasure or pain is to be active with the perceptive mean in relation to good or bad as such. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 431a10) | |
| A reaction: A bizarre view which is interesting, but strikes me as wrong. We are drawn towards pleasure, but judgement can pull us away again, and 'good' is in the judgement, not in the feeling. |
| 4374 | For Aristotle, pleasure is the perception of particulars as valuable [Achtenberg on Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: For Aristotle, pleasure is the perception of particulars as valuable. | |
| From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1173b20) by Deborah Achtenberg - Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics 5.6 | |
| A reaction: This never strikes me as very plausible. Pleasure may be a side-effect of the perception of value, but we can experience pleasure (e.g. a taste) without even knowing what the cause is, let alone whether we value it. |
| 383 | God feels one simple pleasure forever [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: God feels one simple pleasure forever. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1154b25) | |
| A reaction: Compare Idea 382. |
| 5270 | Intellectual pleasures are superior to sensuous ones [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Intellectual pleasures are superior to sensuous ones. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1176a02) | |
| A reaction: This claim, for which he here offers no support, depends on the idea that pleasure can have a value, as well as an intensity. Mill agreed with him, but Bentham disagreed (Idea 5271) |
| 5230 | There are pleasures of the soul (e.g. civic honour, and learning) and of the body [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: We must distinguish pleasures of the soul from pleasures of the body; examples of the former are love of civic distinction and love of learning. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1117b28) | |
| A reaction: An example of where enthusiasm for analysis leads to oversimplification, and of how dualism about mind can colour the rest of one's views. There is a physical pleasure in learning something, and some physical pleasures are almost spiritual. |
| 5259 | If we criticise bodily pleasures as licentious and bad, why do we consider their opposite, pain, to be bad? [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Those who hold that bodily pleasures, which are the concern of the licentious man, are not desirable, ought to consider why in that case the pains that are contrary to them are bad. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1154a08) | |
| A reaction: This seems a simple and effective argument against 'puritanical' views, which sometimes appear in Plato, and in the Stoics (where bodily pleasures are 'indifferent'). Still, I think most people overvalue bodily pleasure. |
| 96 | Nobody would choose the mentality of a child, even if they had the greatest childish pleasures [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Nobody would choose to live his life with the mentality of a child, even if he continued to take the greatest pleasures in the things that children like. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1174a02) | |
| A reaction: This seems absolutely right, but I'm not sure why. Presumably we are strongly attached to our own nature, but what if we could start again with a different nature? |
| 97 | There are many things we would want even if they brought no pleasure [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: There are many things which we should be eager to have even if they brought no pleasure with them, e.g. sight, memory, knowledge, and several kinds of excellence. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1174a06) | |
| A reaction: I think he suggests eyesight, which implies that we want the knowledge that brings. Many things we want give us security, which seems to be an unconscious pleasure. |
| 98 | It is right to pursue pleasure, because it enhances life, and life is a thing to choose [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is reasonable that people should be eager for pleasure; because it perfects life for each individual, and life is a thing to choose. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1175a15) | |
| A reaction: It is so nice to hear that pleasure is a good thing. Compare Socrates in 'Gorgias', who tries to prove that pleasure is not at all what we want. Life with no pleasure is not much of a thing. |
| 99 | If happiness were mere amusement it wouldn't be worth a lifetime's effort [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Happiness is not amusement; it would be paradoxical if we toiled and suffered all our lives just for that. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1176b28) | |
| A reaction: So he promotes contemplation above pleasure as the end of life, on the grounds that it motivates a lifetime of effort? Maybe happiness is quite easy for a lot of people. |
| 5256 | Some things are not naturally pleasant, but become so through disease or depravity [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Some things are not naturally pleasant but become so, either through injury, or through habit, or through congenital depravity. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1148b16) | |
| A reaction: We might say that there are indeed 'unnatural pleasures' (e.g. sadism?), but still have to admit that we have no clear way of distinguishing the natural from the unnatural. What about gambling? Or watching horror films? |
| 5258 | While replenishing we even enjoy unpleasant things, but only absolute pleasures when we are replenished [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: People do not enjoy the same things while their natural state is being replenished as they do when it is complete; in the restored state they enjoy things that are absolutely pleasant, but while it is being replenished they enjoy even unpleasant things. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1152a03) | |
| A reaction: This is a nice distinction, which ties in with the dictum "never go to the supermarket when you are hungry". It is also a nice illustration of Aristotle's vital moral view that there is a 'natural state' for a human being. |
| 49 | Character is revealed by the pleasures and pains people feel [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The pleasure or pain that accompanies people's acts should be taken as a sign of their dispositions. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1104b04) | |
| A reaction: Nice. Nothing reveals a person quicker than their apparently finding rather strange sources for pleasure or dislike. A nice short cut for novelists wanting to reveal character. |
| 53 | Feeling inappropriate pleasure or pain affects conduct, and is central to morality [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: To feel pleasure or pain rightly or wrongly affects our conduct, so our whole enquiry must be concerned with them. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1105a07) | |
| A reaction: Apparently the Nazi staff at Auschwitz said that they all felt largely 'indifferent' to what they were doing. Aristotle hopes you can teach these right feelings, but children can develop very unpredictably. |
| 84 | The greater the pleasure, the greater the hindrance to thought [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Pleasures are a hindrance to thinking, and the more enjoyable the greater the hindrance (e.g. sex). | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1152b15) | |
| A reaction: The intellectual's objection to excessive pleasure. He means practical thought, as well as theorising. |