Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Herodotus, JP Burgess / G Rosen and Arthur Schopenhauer

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15 ideas

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
21380 The only aim of our existence is to grasp that non-existence would be better [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: Nothing else can be stated as the aim of our existence except the knowledge that it would be better for us not to exist.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II 605), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 8 'Denial'
     A reaction: Nonsense on stilts. Nietzsche rebelled against this. If there is such 'knowledge' then it obviously has nothing to do with the aim of our existence. It is just a rejection of aims. The aim is making the best of existence, not spurning it.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
21374 We should no more expect ethical theory to produce good people than aesthetics to produce artists [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: We should be just as foolish to expect that our moral systems and ethics would create virtuous, noble and hold men, as that our aesthetics would produce poets, painterd and musicians.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 271), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 7 'Against'
     A reaction: Presumably the aim of ethical theory is to understand the truths about ethics. That can't do any harm, can it? In every other area of life we think that understanding leads to improvement. Unless, of course, there are no truths of ethics....
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
21378 We clearly feel responsible for our deeds, because we are quite certain that we did them [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: Another fact of consciousness ...is the wholly clear and certain feeling of responsibility for what we do, of the accountability of our actions, which rests on the unshakable certainty that we ourselves are the doers of our deeds.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (On the Freedom of the Will [1841], p.93-4), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 7 'Freedom'
     A reaction: The point is that we have this feeling even if we do not believe in free will. I am struck by the fact that responsibility is very obvious in our own case, even if it is not when we objectively consider other people. Even villains can feel guilty.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
21375 Reason can be vicious, and great crimes have to be rational [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: Reasonable and vicious are quite consistent with each other, in fact, only through their union are great and far-reaching crimes possible.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (On the Basis of Morality [1841], p.83), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 7 'Against'
     A reaction: This is opposed to Kant, who always looks wildly optimistic in his hope that high rationality entails a morally good will. Good people seem to have a fairly irrational empathy with their fellow citizens.
21915 To deduce morality from reason is blasphemy, because it is holy, and far above reason [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: To deduce from reason [Vernunft] the moral element in conduct is blasphemy. In this element there is expressed the better consciousness which lies far above all reason. expresses itself in conduct as holiness, and is the true salvation of the world.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Manuscript remains [1855], I p.47), quoted by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 3
     A reaction: Aimed at Kant. Only Plato could inspire a non-religious person to write about morality is such terms. Maybe also the stoic ideal of beautiful deeds (given the supreme value Schopenhauer placed on the arts).
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
21483 Man is essentially a dreadful wild animal [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: Man is at bottom a dreadful wild animal.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], VIII:114)
     A reaction: As an example he cites the slave owners in the United States.
21379 Man's three basic ethical incentives are egoism, malice and compassion [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: Man's three fundamental ethical incentives, egoism, malice and compassion, are present in everyone in different and incredibly unequal proportions. In accordance with them, motives will operate on man and actions will ensue.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (On the Basis of Morality [1841], p.192), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 7 'Egoism'
     A reaction: A well chosen trio. Kant would be shocked that he has left out duty, which is supposed to rise above such feelings.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
4181 Every good is essentially relative, for it has its essential nature only in its relation to a desiring will [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: Every good is essentially relative, for it has its essential nature only in its relation to a desiring will.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.65)
     A reaction: A nice way of stating the core of moral relativism. To me, though, it just seems a rejection of morality. Conflicting wills bring moral paralysis. Might is right.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
5649 Will casts aside each of its temporary fulfilments, so human life has no ultimate aim [Schopenhauer, by Scruton]
     Full Idea: Since for Schopenhauer will has no intrinsic end, but breaks through all its temporary fulfilments and casts them aside as irrelevant once attained, it becomes impossible to assert that there is any ultimate aim to human activity.
     From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819]) by Roger Scruton - Short History of Modern Philosophy Ch.13
     A reaction: This sums up part of the modern anti-teleological view of life, with its notion of purposes which can only arise out of consciousnesses. Such a view leaves untouched the key question, which is "What should I will?"
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
4177 Most people would probably choose non-existence at the end of their life, rather than relive the whole thing [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: Perhaps no one at the end of his life, if he gives the matter sober consideration and is, at the same time, frank, ever wishes to live it over again; he more readily chooses non-existence.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.59)
     A reaction: Hence Nietzsche's doctrine of 'eternal return' (Gay Science §341, idea 2936). From Schopenhauer it is just bleak pessimism, but from Nietzsche it is a wonderful challenge to live, perhaps the best ever.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
4185 Altruistic people make less distinction than usual between themselves and others [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: If we observe an altruistic action the simplest explanation and the essential character of the person's conduct is that they make less distinction than is usually made between themselves and others.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.66)
     A reaction: Obvious, really, but Schopenhauer is talking about the will. Is the effacement of the Self desirable, apart from the benefit it might bring to other people. I don't find it appealing.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
4183 Only self-love can motivate morality, but that also makes it worthless [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: A theory of morals which motivates can only do so by working on self-love, but what springs from this latter has no moral worth.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], IV.66)
     A reaction: I just don't believe this pessimism. Schopenhauer was an incipient social darwinist who needed a course in modern game theory. Or he just needed to be a nicer man.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
4172 Happiness is the swift movement from desire to satisfaction, and then again on to desire [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: We are fortunate if we keep up the game whereby desire passes into satisfaction, and satisfaction into new desire - if the pace of this is swift, it is called happiness, and if it is slow, sorrow.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], II 029)
     A reaction: This seems to be the dream of the addict, as Socrates points out with his example of the leaky jar in 'Gorgias'. Should we want more desires?
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
21371 We can never attain happiness while our will is pursuing desires [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: So long as our consciousness is filled by our will, so long as we are given up to the throng of desires with its constant hopes and fears, so long as we are the subject of willing, we never attain lasting happiness or peace.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 196), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 6 'Aesthetic'
     A reaction: I hate this idea. It obviously leads to his Buddhism, and the eastern idea that life is generally a bad idea and to be avoided. I think Nietzsche rebelled strongly against this attitude of Schopenhauer's.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
21466 Pleasure is weaker, and pain stronger, than we expect [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: As a rule we find pleasure much less pleasurable, pain much more painful than we expected.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Parerga and Paralipomena [1851], XII:149)
     A reaction: Never go on holiday with Schopenhauer. This is more accurate about pain, I think.