Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Herodotus, Thomas Nagel and Slavoj Zizek

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8 ideas

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
Morality must be motivating, and not because of pre-moral motives [Nagel]
     Full Idea: My own view is that moral justification must be capable of motivating, but not in virtue of reliance on pre-moral motives.
     From: Thomas Nagel (Equality and Partiality [1991], Ch.5)
     A reaction: This may well be the core and essence of Kantian moral theory. I'm inclined to think of it as 'Kant's dream', which is of ultra-rational beings who are driven by pure rationality as a motivator. People who fit this bill tend to be academics.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
There is no one theory of how to act (or what to believe) [Nagel]
     Full Idea: To look for a single general theory of how to decide the right thing to do is like looking for a single theory of how to decide what to believe.
     From: Thomas Nagel (The Fragmentation of Value [1977], p.135)
     A reaction: Depends on your level of generality. Values and virtues are general guides which should be brought to every action, with 'higher' values guiding choice of what is relevant.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
Total objectivity can't see value, but it sees many people with values [Nagel]
     Full Idea: A purely objective view has no way of knowing whether anything has any value, but actually its data include the appearance of value to individuals with particular perspectives, including oneself.
     From: Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], VIII.2)
     A reaction: I would have thought that a very objective assessment of someone's health is an obvious revelation of value, irrespective of anyone's particular perspective.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
We don't worry about the time before we were born the way we worry about death [Nagel]
     Full Idea: We do not regard the period before we were born in the same way that we regard the prospect of death.
     From: Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], XI.3)
     A reaction: This is a challenge to Epicurus, who said death is no worse than pre-birth. This idea may be true of the situation immediately post-death, but a thousand years from now it is hard to distinguish them.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
Tolerance and love are strategies to avoid encountering our neighbours [Zizek]
     Full Idea: All this preaching about tolerance, love for one's neighbour and so on, are ultimately strategies to avoid encountering the neighbour.
     From: Slavoj Zizek (Conversations, with Glyn Daly [2004], §2)
     A reaction: I have begun to wonder whether some such motivation underlies the modern obsession with raising huge sums for charity.
If our own life lacks meaning, devotion to others won't give it meaning [Nagel]
     Full Idea: If no one's life has any meaning in itself, how can it acquire meaning through devotion to the meaningless lives of others?
     From: Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], XI.2)
     A reaction: This is one of the paradoxes of compassion. The other is that the virtue requires other people to be in need of help, which can't be a desirable situation.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
Pain doesn't have a further property of badness; it gives a reason for its avoidance [Nagel]
     Full Idea: The objective badness of pain is not some mysterious further property that all pains have, but just the fact that there is reason for anyone capable of viewing the world objectively to want it to stop.
     From: Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], VIII.2)
     A reaction: Presumably all pains (e.g. of grief and of toothache) have something in common, to qualify as pains. It must be more than being disliked, because we can dislike a food.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / i. Moral luck
Moral luck can arise in character, preconditions, actual circumstances, and outcome [Nagel]
     Full Idea: Moral luck involves one's character, the antecedent circumstances of the act, the actual circumstances of the act, and the outcome of the act.
     From: Thomas Nagel (Moral Luck [1976], p.28)
     A reaction: Meaning, I take it, that there can be luck in any one of those four. A neat slicing up that doesn't quite fit the real world, where things flow. Helpful, though.