display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
44 ideas
| 20 | The good is 'that at which all things aim' [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The Good has rightly been defined as 'that at which all things aim'. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1094a02) | |
| A reaction: So it is logically impossible to aim at evil? Maybe in practice people always aim for what they take to be good, but it must be possible to deliberately do evil, just to prove a point. |
| 629 | Is the good a purpose, a source of movement, or a pure form? [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The good is a principle for all things, and is so in the very highest degree, but in what way? As a purpose, as a source of movement, or as a form? | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1075a32) | |
| A reaction: I tend to think of it as an 'ideal', whatever that is, and hence an inspiration, but a rather vague one. Beauty, goodness and truth. Surely not a source of movement? |
| 5128 | Each category of existence has its own good, so one Good cannot unite them [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Things are called good in as many senses as they are said to exist (e.g. substance, quality, quantity, relation, place, time); clearly, then, there cannot be a single universal common to all cases. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1096a23) | |
| A reaction: It doesn't follow that because you can divide the substratum, that therefore the superstructure lacks unity. One tree has many roots. We must ask whether a good substance and a good quantity have anything in common. |
| 5129 | There should be one science of the one Good, but there are many overlapping sciences [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Of things that come under one Idea there is one single science, so there should be some one science of all good things; but in fact there are more than one science even of those that fall under one category (e.g. opportunity in medicine and in war). | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1096a27) | |
| A reaction: The reply might be that there are many sciences because humans are confused. A truly wise person would see that the science of opportunity is the same in medicine and war. If the good was pleasure, or the glory of God, this would be obvious. |
| 5110 | Goodness is when a thing (such as a circle) is complete, and conforms with its nature [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Goodness is a kind of completion: it is when something becomes as good as it may be that we say that it is complete, because that is when it pre-eminently conforms with its nature. A circle is complete when it is as good a circle as there could be. | |
| From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 246a12) | |
| A reaction: This, in turn, is said by Aristotle to result from the telos (purpose) of the thing. This won't eliminate the problem of relativism, unless we say that something cannot have an evil 'nature'. Was the Black Death good, by this definition? |
| 5131 | Intelligence and sight, and some pleasures and honours, are candidates for being good in themselves [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: What sort of things can one posit as good in themselves? Everything that is pursued even when considered in isolation - intelligence, for example, and sight, and some pleasures and honours? | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1096b15) | |
| A reaction: He means good-for-man, of course. If only 'some' pleasures are good, that implies a further good which is used to judge the pleasures. For Aristotle what is 'fine' (kalon) is the ultimate self-evident good. |
| 5135 | Goods are external, of the soul, and of the body; those of the soul (such as action) come first [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Goods have been classified (by Plato) under three heads, as external, or of the soul, or of the body; of these we say that goods of the soul are good in the strictest and fullest sense, and we rank actions as goods of the soul. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1098b13) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle is famous (or notorious) for allowing external goods in his theory, but it is important that he always makes them subordinate to the central goods. Wealth and glamour could never compensate for vice. |
| 23 | The masses believe, not unreasonably, that the good is pleasure [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The masses…seem - not unreasonably - to believe that the Good or happiness is pleasure. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1095b15) | |
| A reaction: Since Aristotle seems to see the pursuit of understanding, through various types of philosophy, as the supreme good, then this is 'understandable' because the masses lack the education for such a thing. |
| 5269 | Pleasure is not the Good, and not every pleasure is desirable [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is clear, then, that pleasure is not the Good, and that not every pleasure is desirable. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1174a08) | |
| A reaction: This is the culmination of a length discussion. Despite all of Aristotle's efforts, it may well be impossible to demonstrate that pleasure is not the Good. All the rivals, such as knowledge, intelligence, sight, excellence etc. give great pleasure. |
| 109 | Clearly perfect conduct will involve both good intention and good action [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is disputed whether the intentions or the actions have greater importance; …clearly the perfection of conduct will involve both. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1178a32) | |
| A reaction: This seems right, so choosing one or the other as prior seems misguided. What to make of attempted murder? What of moral luck? |
| 5877 | We judge people from their deeds because we cannot see their choices (which matter more) [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is because it is not easy to discern what sort of choice it is that we are forced to judge from the deeds what sort of person someone is; the activity is more worth having, but the choice is commended more. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1228a15) | |
| A reaction: This shows why Aristotle is the most important opponent of consequentialism. It is hard to see how one could praise a self-interested deed simply because it benefited others. Greed is never good. |
| 22555 | The function of good men is to confer benefits [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Conferring benefits is just what it is the function of good men to do. | |
| From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1286b10) | |
| A reaction: Kant cannot ignore consequences (when assessing the maxim), and the great virtue theorist can't ignore them when judging virtuous behaviour. |
| 26 | Wealth is not the good, because it is only a means [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Wealth is obviously not the good we are seeking, because it serves only as a means. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1096a06) | |
| A reaction: So what are we to say to someone who considers wealth to be an end? Someone who has no desire to spend their horde. |
| 5136 | Happiness seems to involve virtue, or practical reason, or wisdom, or pleasure, or external goods [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Candidates for the required constituents of happiness are said to be virtue, or practical reason, or wisdom; others say it is these with the addition of pleasure, and others include favourable external conditions. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1098b21) | |
| A reaction: Characteristic of Aristotle to start from what both ordinary people and philosophers have previously said. By the end of his book (remarkably) wisdom is the only one of these which is excluded from normal human happiness. Wisdom transcends life. |
| 5868 | Horses, birds and fish are not happy, lacking a divine aspect to their natures [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: No horse or bird or fish is happy, nor any other thing that there is which does not have a share by its nature in the divine. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1217a26) | |
| A reaction: Pet owners will all feel their beloved companions have been insulted, but I agree with this. 'Happy' does not here mean 'in a state of pleasure'. A fully successful bird does little more than the four f's (feed, fornicate, flee, fight). |
| 25 | You can be good while asleep, or passive, or in pain [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The possession of goodness is thought to be compatible with being asleep, or…with inactivity, or…with atrocious suffering. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1096a02) | |
| A reaction: This helps to distinguish eudaimonia from the pleasant view of happiness. Pain probably annuls most immediate happiness, but has little to do with long-term flourishing. |
| 18673 | Eudaimonia is said to only have final value, where reason and virtue are also useful [Aristotle, by Orsi] |
| Full Idea: For Aristotle, what sets eudaimonia apart from things like reason and virtue is that it is exclusively finally valuable; ...reason and virtue are valuable also for contributing to other things, such as happiness. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE]) by Francesco Orsi - Value Theory 2.2 | |
| A reaction: This makes it sound as if eudaimonia is a super-value, and superior to virtue, but I don't think that is right. Eudaimonia just seems to be success in the areas that matter. |
| 5127 | Does Aristotle say eudaimonia is the aim, or that it ought to be? [McDowell on Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: We can distinguish at least two possible interpretations of Aristotle's thesis that eudaimonia is the chief good: either eudaimonia is that for the sake of which all action IS undertaken, or that for which all action OUGHT to be undertaken. | |
| From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1097b22) by John McDowell - Role of Eudaimonia in Aristotle's Ethics §1 | |
| A reaction: It seems to me Aristotle is describing how people DO behave (they all want ot flourish), and then goes on to describe how they OUGHT to behave to achieve the end they all want. His theory does not describe convention, which mostly concerns pleasure. |
| 5143 | Some good and evil can happen to the dead, just as the living may be unaware of a disaster [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is popularly believed that some good and evil, such as honours, or disasters of children, can happen to a dead man, inasmuch as they can happen to a live one without his being aware of them. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1100a17) | |
| A reaction: This suggests 'internalist' and 'externalist' accounts of happiness, with eudaimonia being the externalist view. If an architect designs a spectacular building, and it collapses the day after they die, that has to be a disaster for the architect. |
| 2681 | Aristotle is unsure about eudaimonia because he is unsure what people are [Nagel on Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle shows an indecision between an intellectualist and a comprehensive account of eudaimonia. …It is because he is not sure who we are that he finds it difficult to say unequivocally in what our eudaimonia consists. | |
| From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE]) by Thomas Nagel - Aristotle on Eudaimonia p.8 | |
| A reaction: Aristotle is quite right to be unsure about what people are, given the fluidity of human nature, in comparison with other animals. He needs a stable core to human nature, and I think that exists. |
| 5132 | Goods like pleasure are chosen partly for happiness, but happiness is chosen just for itself [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Happiness more than anything else is thought to be a final end without qualification, because we always choose it for itself, and not for any other reason. Pleasure, intelligence and good qualities generally we choose partly for the sake of our happiness. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1097a32) | |
| A reaction: The obvious reply is that happiness might be chosen because it gives us pleasure. Imagine if a sense of happiness resulted in an instant feeling of guilt. If we could ONLY have intelligence, we would choose that just for itself. |
| 30 | Happiness is perfect and self-sufficient, the end of all action [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Happiness is found to be something perfect and self-sufficient, being the end to which our actions are directed. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1097b21) | |
| A reaction: This will be eudaimonia, so while this sounds like an announcement of the secret of life, eudaimonia is only really a placeholder for things going very well, in some way or other. |
| 5850 | Happiness is composed of a catalogue of internal and external benefits [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The elements of happiness are: gentle birth, many virtuous friends, wealth, creditable and extensive offspring, a comfortable old age; also health, beauty, strength, size and competitiveness, reputation, status, luck and the virtues. | |
| From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1360b18) | |
| A reaction: This is Aristotle's pluralism, and his commitment to 'external goods' (rather than the inner good of pure virtue, which the Stoics preferred). 'Gentle birth' might turn out to mean good upbringing and education. Who was the most 'beautiful' philosopher? |
| 106 | The best life is that of the intellect, since that is in the fullest sense the man [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The best and most pleasant life is the life of the intellect, since the intellect is in the fullest sense the man. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1178a08) | |
| A reaction: He would say that, wouldn't he? He's Aristotle, after all. The question of what is a human's essential nature is the nub of the Aristotelian project. |
| 100 | The happy life is in accordance with goodness, which implies seriousness [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The happy life seems to be lived in accordance with goodness, and such a life implies seriousness. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1177a03) | |
| A reaction: There are far more jokes in the talk of Socrates than in the writings of Aristotle. Presumably seriousness is required by anything which turns out to be difficult. |
| 39 | Happiness needs total goodness and a complete life [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Happiness demands not only complete goodness but a complete life (e.g. final misfortune of King Priam of Troy). | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1100a05) | |
| A reaction: Eudaimonia may be ruined if a serious defect of character emerges near the end, but surely not if they are merely the victim of misfortune? |
| 5139 | If happiness can be achieved by study and effort, then it is open to anyone who is not corrupt [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If happiness is not a divine gift, it will be something widely shared; for it can attach, through some form of study or application, to anyone who is not handicapped by some incapacity for goodness. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1099b17) | |
| A reaction: This is a non-elitist view, even though he is saying that study and effort are needed. The explanation of this is that happiness is not achieved through wisdom, but through practical reason (phronesis), which does not require advanced education. |
| 5144 | Happiness is activity in accordance with complete virtue, for a whole life, with adequate external goods [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: We define the happy man as 'one who is active in accordance with complete virtue, and who is adequately furnished with external goods, and that not for some unspecified period but throughout a complete life'. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1101a13) | |
| A reaction: The only plausible objection to this definition is that it sounds worthy but dull. There is some exciting, romantic, Nietzschean ingredient missing - but the happy man will routinely perform 'fine deeds', and these may involve novelty and boldness. |
| 5865 | Happiness involves three things, of which the greatest is either wisdom, virtue, or pleasure [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: To be happy, and to live the fine and divinely-happy life, would seem to reside in three things above all, ..for some say that wisdom is the greatest good, others virtue, others pleasure. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1214a30) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle is well-known for his pluralist answer to this question: virtue is crucial, wisdom is perhaps the greatest of the virtues, and pleasure improves everything in life. |
| 4376 | Pleasure and pain are perceptions of things as good or bad [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: To experience pleasure or pain is to be active with the perceptive mean in relation to good or bad as such. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 431a10) | |
| A reaction: A bizarre view which is interesting, but strikes me as wrong. We are drawn towards pleasure, but judgement can pull us away again, and 'good' is in the judgement, not in the feeling. |
| 4374 | For Aristotle, pleasure is the perception of particulars as valuable [Achtenberg on Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: For Aristotle, pleasure is the perception of particulars as valuable. | |
| From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1173b20) by Deborah Achtenberg - Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics 5.6 | |
| A reaction: This never strikes me as very plausible. Pleasure may be a side-effect of the perception of value, but we can experience pleasure (e.g. a taste) without even knowing what the cause is, let alone whether we value it. |
| 383 | God feels one simple pleasure forever [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: God feels one simple pleasure forever. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1154b25) | |
| A reaction: Compare Idea 382. |
| 5270 | Intellectual pleasures are superior to sensuous ones [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Intellectual pleasures are superior to sensuous ones. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1176a02) | |
| A reaction: This claim, for which he here offers no support, depends on the idea that pleasure can have a value, as well as an intensity. Mill agreed with him, but Bentham disagreed (Idea 5271) |
| 5230 | There are pleasures of the soul (e.g. civic honour, and learning) and of the body [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: We must distinguish pleasures of the soul from pleasures of the body; examples of the former are love of civic distinction and love of learning. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1117b28) | |
| A reaction: An example of where enthusiasm for analysis leads to oversimplification, and of how dualism about mind can colour the rest of one's views. There is a physical pleasure in learning something, and some physical pleasures are almost spiritual. |
| 5259 | If we criticise bodily pleasures as licentious and bad, why do we consider their opposite, pain, to be bad? [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Those who hold that bodily pleasures, which are the concern of the licentious man, are not desirable, ought to consider why in that case the pains that are contrary to them are bad. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1154a08) | |
| A reaction: This seems a simple and effective argument against 'puritanical' views, which sometimes appear in Plato, and in the Stoics (where bodily pleasures are 'indifferent'). Still, I think most people overvalue bodily pleasure. |
| 96 | Nobody would choose the mentality of a child, even if they had the greatest childish pleasures [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Nobody would choose to live his life with the mentality of a child, even if he continued to take the greatest pleasures in the things that children like. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1174a02) | |
| A reaction: This seems absolutely right, but I'm not sure why. Presumably we are strongly attached to our own nature, but what if we could start again with a different nature? |
| 97 | There are many things we would want even if they brought no pleasure [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: There are many things which we should be eager to have even if they brought no pleasure with them, e.g. sight, memory, knowledge, and several kinds of excellence. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1174a06) | |
| A reaction: I think he suggests eyesight, which implies that we want the knowledge that brings. Many things we want give us security, which seems to be an unconscious pleasure. |
| 98 | It is right to pursue pleasure, because it enhances life, and life is a thing to choose [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is reasonable that people should be eager for pleasure; because it perfects life for each individual, and life is a thing to choose. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1175a15) | |
| A reaction: It is so nice to hear that pleasure is a good thing. Compare Socrates in 'Gorgias', who tries to prove that pleasure is not at all what we want. Life with no pleasure is not much of a thing. |
| 99 | If happiness were mere amusement it wouldn't be worth a lifetime's effort [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Happiness is not amusement; it would be paradoxical if we toiled and suffered all our lives just for that. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1176b28) | |
| A reaction: So he promotes contemplation above pleasure as the end of life, on the grounds that it motivates a lifetime of effort? Maybe happiness is quite easy for a lot of people. |
| 5258 | While replenishing we even enjoy unpleasant things, but only absolute pleasures when we are replenished [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: People do not enjoy the same things while their natural state is being replenished as they do when it is complete; in the restored state they enjoy things that are absolutely pleasant, but while it is being replenished they enjoy even unpleasant things. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1152a03) | |
| A reaction: This is a nice distinction, which ties in with the dictum "never go to the supermarket when you are hungry". It is also a nice illustration of Aristotle's vital moral view that there is a 'natural state' for a human being. |
| 5256 | Some things are not naturally pleasant, but become so through disease or depravity [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Some things are not naturally pleasant but become so, either through injury, or through habit, or through congenital depravity. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1148b16) | |
| A reaction: We might say that there are indeed 'unnatural pleasures' (e.g. sadism?), but still have to admit that we have no clear way of distinguishing the natural from the unnatural. What about gambling? Or watching horror films? |
| 49 | Character is revealed by the pleasures and pains people feel [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The pleasure or pain that accompanies people's acts should be taken as a sign of their dispositions. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1104b04) | |
| A reaction: Nice. Nothing reveals a person quicker than their apparently finding rather strange sources for pleasure or dislike. A nice short cut for novelists wanting to reveal character. |
| 53 | Feeling inappropriate pleasure or pain affects conduct, and is central to morality [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: To feel pleasure or pain rightly or wrongly affects our conduct, so our whole enquiry must be concerned with them. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1105a07) | |
| A reaction: Apparently the Nazi staff at Auschwitz said that they all felt largely 'indifferent' to what they were doing. Aristotle hopes you can teach these right feelings, but children can develop very unpredictably. |
| 84 | The greater the pleasure, the greater the hindrance to thought [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Pleasures are a hindrance to thinking, and the more enjoyable the greater the hindrance (e.g. sex). | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1152b15) | |
| A reaction: The intellectual's objection to excessive pleasure. He means practical thought, as well as theorising. |