Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Christine M. Korsgaard and Reiss,J/Spreger,J

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5 ideas

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Maybe final value rests on the extrinsic property of being valued by a rational agent [Korsgaard, by Orsi]
     Full Idea: Korsgaard argues for the ultimate dependence of final value on the extrinsic property of being valued by a rational agent.
     From: report of Christine M. Korsgaard (Creating the Kingdom of Ends [1992]) by Francesco Orsi - Value Theory 2.3 n4
     A reaction: This hyper-Kantian view doesn't strike me as very plausible. Not philosophical theory which entirely cuts animals out of the story has much appeal for me.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
If we can't reason about value, we can reason about the unconditional source of value [Korsgaard]
     Full Idea: If you can only know what is intrinsically valuable through intuition (as Moore claims), you can still argue about what is unconditionally valuable. There must be something unconditionally valuable because there must be a source of value.
     From: Christine M. Korsgaard (Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value [1986], 8 'Three')
     A reaction: If you only grasped the values through intuition, does that give you enough information to infer the dependence relations between values?
An end can't be an ultimate value just because it is useless! [Korsgaard]
     Full Idea: If what is final is whatever is an end but never a means, ...why should something be more valuable just because it is useless?
     From: Christine M. Korsgaard (Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value [1986], 8 'Finality')
     A reaction: Korsgaard is offering this as a bad reading of what Aristotle intends.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Self-concern may be a source of pain, or a lack of self-respect, or a failure of responsibility [Korsgaard]
     Full Idea: For utilitarians, self-concern causes needless pain; for Kantians, it evinces a lack of respect for one's own humanity; for the religious moralist, it is a failure of responsibility for what has been placed in one's special care.
     From: Christine M. Korsgaard (Intro to 'Creating the Kingdom of Ends' [1996], §5)
     A reaction: Worryingly, given my heathenish views, I find the third one the most congenial. If we don't take responsibility for our own selves (e.g. for having a great talent), then no one (even parents) will take responsibility for anything.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Goodness is given either by a psychological state, or the attribution of a property [Korsgaard]
     Full Idea: 'Subjectivism' identifies good ends with or by reference to some psychological state. ...'Objectivism' says that something is good as an end if a property, intrinsic goodness, is attributed to it.
     From: Christine M. Korsgaard (Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value [1986], 8 'Three')