display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
7 ideas
| 4130 | There couldn't be a moral rule of which a man could not justly demand a reason [Locke] |
| Full Idea: There cannot any one moral rule be proposed, whereof a man may not justly demand a reason. | |
| From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 1.03.04) | |
| A reaction: I am more with Locke than Williams here. One can demand reasons up to the point where no one can provide them. Then we look for plan B, which probably ought to be conservative. |
| 20447 | The problems is not justifying ethics, but motivating it. Why should a self seek its good? [Critchley] |
| Full Idea: The issue is not so much justification as motivation, that in virtue of which the self can be motivated to act on some conception of the good. ...How does a self bind itself to whatever it determines as its good? | |
| From: Simon Critchley (Impossible Objects: interviews [2012], 2) | |
| A reaction: That is a bold and interesting idea about the starting point for ethics. It is always a problem for Aristotle, that he can offer no motivation for the quest for virtue. Contractarians start from existing motivations, but that isn't impressive. |
| 12495 | Pursuit of happiness is the highest perfection of intellectual nature [Locke] |
| Full Idea: The highest perfection of intellectual nature lies in a careful and constant pursuit of true and solid happiness. | |
| From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.21.51) | |
| A reaction: A nice remark, in which the word 'intellectual' is particularly interesting. Locke is inclined to equate happiness with pleasure and the absence of pain. |
| 12541 | Morality can be demonstrated, because we know the real essences behind moral words [Locke] |
| Full Idea: Morality is capable of demonstration as well as mathematics, since the precise real essence of the things moral words stand for may be perfectly known, and so the congruity or incongruity of the things themselves be certainly discovered. | |
| From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 3.11.16) | |
| A reaction: This is a rare case of Locke saying that we can know real essences (he apparently having said the same about triangles). I increasingly like the notion that real essences lead to true knowledge in every sphere of our activities, including the moral. |
| 12473 | We can demand a reason for any moral rule [Locke] |
| Full Idea: There cannot any one moral Rule be proposed, whereof a Man may not justly demand a Reason. | |
| From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 1.03.04) | |
| A reaction: There may be some things which are indisputable duties or prohibitions, and yet people be quite bewildered when asked for the reason behind the rule. Loyalty, incest, courage. |
| 7067 | Food first, then ethics [Critchley] |
| Full Idea: Food first, then ethics. | |
| From: Simon Critchley (Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro [2001], 8857) | |
| A reaction: This is not a dismissal of philosophy, but a key fact which ethical philosophers must face up to. See Mr Doolittle's speech in Shaw's 'Pygmalion. It connects to the debate c.1610 about whether one is entitled to grab someone's plank to avoid drowning. |
| 1386 | A concern for happiness is the inevitable result of consciousness [Locke] |
| Full Idea: A concern for happiness is the unavoidable concomitant of consciousness; that which is conscious of pleasure and pain, desiring that that self that is conscious should be happy. | |
| From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.27.26) | |
| A reaction: It is an interesting question whether a being would be concerned with 'happiness' if they were conscious thinkers, but lacking pleasure and pain. Presumably they would desire eudaimonia - that their life go well, in some way. |