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5576
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We cannot derive moral laws from experience, as it is the mother of illusion [Kant]
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Full Idea:
With respect to moral laws, experience is (alas!) the mother of illusion, and it is most reprehensible to derive the laws concerning what I ought to do from what is done, or to want to limit it to that.
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From:
Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B375/A319)
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A reaction:
Kant agrees with Hume, and turns to a non-naturalistic and cognitivist explanation, whereas Hume turns to a non-cognitivist naturalistic one (based on human feelings). Aristotle's view is somewhat based on the experience of human nature.
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20748
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We do not add value to naked things; its involvement is disclosed in understanding it [Heidegger]
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Full Idea:
We do not throw a 'signification' over some naked thing which is present-at-hand, we do not stick a value on it; but when something is encountered as such, the thing in question has an involvement which is disclosed in our understanding of the world.
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From:
Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.190-1), quoted by George Dickie - The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude 3 'Undoing'
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A reaction:
Analytic philosophy and science have tried to dismantle experience, and Heidegger wants to put it back together. I would say there is a big difference between encountering a thing (which is a bit facty), and understanding it (which is more valuey).
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9749
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Our rational choices confer value, arising from the sense that we ourselves are important [Kant, by Korsgaard]
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Full Idea:
According to Kant, we confer value on the objects of our rational choices. ..When we choose things because they are important to us we are taking ourselves to be important. Hence our humanity is a source of value.
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From:
report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Christine M. Korsgaard - Intro to 'Creating the Kingdom of Ends' ix
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A reaction:
He's trying to filter to out our gormless choices with the word 'rational', but it is common sense that I may choose things despite thinking they have little value, like watching soap opera. A more objective account of value seems needed. See 9750!
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7671
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Values are created by human choices, and are not some intrinsic quality, out there [Kant, by Berlin]
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Full Idea:
Kant's fundamental sermon is that a value is made a value (or, at least, a duty) by human choice and not by some intrinsic quality in itself, out there. Values are what humans freely choose to live, fight and die for.
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From:
report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Isaiah Berlin - The Roots of Romanticism Ch.4
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A reaction:
If this is right, then it would appear that the great Kant is the father of relativism, which wouldn't please him. However, his whole system rests on what is consistent and rational, and that seems to a value that is above our choices.
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22007
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An autonomous agent has dignity [Würde], which has absolute worth [Kant, by Pinkard]
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Full Idea:
For Kant, there is something about beings that can act autonomously that is itself of 'absolute worth', which Kant calls the 'dignity' [Würde] of each such agent.
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From:
report of Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788]) by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 02
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A reaction:
This answers my puzzle about where Kant's fundamental values come from. Surely wicked actions can be autonomous? Autonomous actions aren't thereby good actions. A 'good' will, course, whatever that is. Rational? My problem with existentialist ethics.
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6192
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Good or evil cannot be a thing, but only a maxim of action, making the person good or evil [Kant]
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Full Idea:
If something is held to be absolutely good or evil in all respects and without qualification, it could not be a thing but only the manner of acting, i.e., it could only be the maxim of the will, and consequently the acting person himself is good or evil.
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From:
Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788], I.1.II)
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A reaction:
It goes on to deny that pain is intrinsically evil, but his reason for the claim is not clear. Nevetheless, I think he is right. This remark is an important bridge between Enlightenment concerns with law and Greek concerns with character.
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21431
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The love of man is required in order to present the world as a beautiful and perfect moral whole [Kant]
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Full Idea:
Love of man is required by itself, in order to present the world as a beautiful moral whole in its full perfection, even if no account is taken of advantages (of happiness).
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From:
Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 458 I.II)
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A reaction:
For me, this illustrates the basic problem with Kant. In the Groundwork he presents morality as arising from pure reason, deriving moral maxims from contradictions, but here we find a totally ungrounded assertion of grand traditional values.
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21437
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All morality directs the will to love of others' ends, and respect for others' rights [Kant]
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Full Idea:
All moral relations of rational beings, which involve a principle of the harmony of the will of one with another, can be reduced to love and respect. Love reduces one's will to another's end, and respect to another's right.
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From:
Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 488 II)
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A reaction:
It all comes out too neat and tidy in Kant. Love doesn't merely focus on another person's 'ends', and respect should be for a lot more than another person's mere 'rights'. They'd have to be natural rights, because some societies restrict rights.
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21455
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We only understand what exists, and can find no sign of what ought to be in nature [Kant]
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Full Idea:
In nature the understanding cognizes only what exists, or has been, or will be. It is impossible that something ought to be other that what it in fact is. ...We cannot ask what ought to happen in nature, any more than what properties a circle should have.
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From:
Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B575/A547)
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A reaction:
This seems to be the first clear recognition of what we now call 'normativity', which seems like a misfit in naturalistic views. Davidson derives a sort of mental dualism from it. Note that powers and dispositions can also not be directly cognised.
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