Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Porphyry, Thales and Simon Critchley

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4 ideas

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
The problems is not justifying ethics, but motivating it. Why should a self seek its good? [Critchley]
     Full Idea: The issue is not so much justification as motivation, that in virtue of which the self can be motivated to act on some conception of the good. ...How does a self bind itself to whatever it determines as its good?
     From: Simon Critchley (Impossible Objects: interviews [2012], 2)
     A reaction: That is a bold and interesting idea about the starting point for ethics. It is always a problem for Aristotle, that he can offer no motivation for the quest for virtue. Contractarians start from existing motivations, but that isn't impressive.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Justice is each person fulfilling his function [Porphyry]
     Full Idea: Justice, as has been rightly said, consists in each one fulfilling his [authentic and proper] function.
     From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn5 44)
     A reaction: This is presumably a direct reference to the theory in Plato's 'Republic'. It makes the connection between virtue and function which I take to be basic to virtue theory, giving it a naturalistic advantaged over other theories.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Food first, then ethics [Critchley]
     Full Idea: Food first, then ethics.
     From: Simon Critchley (Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro [2001], 8857)
     A reaction: This is not a dismissal of philosophy, but a key fact which ethical philosophers must face up to. See Mr Doolittle's speech in Shaw's 'Pygmalion. It connects to the debate c.1610 about whether one is entitled to grab someone's plank to avoid drowning.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
We should avoid the pleasures of love, or at least, should not enact our dreams [Porphyry]
     Full Idea: The pleasures of love will not even involuntarily be tasted, at least, she will not allow herself to be drawn beyond the lights of fancy that occur in dreams.
     From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 1Enn2 I.4)
     A reaction: Presumably erotic dreams are only tolerated because not much can be done about them. This brings out the puritanism of neo-platonism.