Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Roger Penrose, Bert Leuridan and John Kekes

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12 ideas

22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
We are bound to regret some values we never aspired to [Kekes]
     Full Idea: We inevitably feel regret for the many values we could have, but did not, try to realize.
     From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 04.5)
     A reaction: He's obviously talking about working harder at our projects.
There are far more values than we can pursue, so they are optional possibilities [Kekes]
     Full Idea: A significant feature of our system of values is that it provides many more values than we could pursue. ...We encounter values as possibilities, and we must accept or reject them.
     From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 03.1)
     A reaction: This immediately invites the lovely question of what values you are going to invoke when you discriminate among the values available in your culture. Nietzsche says it comes down to 'taste'.
Innumerable values arise for us, from our humanity, our culture, and our individuality [Kekes]
     Full Idea: There is an irreducible plurality of values that follow from the universal requirements of human well-being, from a shared cultural identity, and from individual conceptions of well-being.
     From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 05 Intro)
     A reaction: This strikes me as a very helpful division. It seems reasonably obvious, but I have not encountered it elsewhere. It is an obvious foundation for international negotiations. We can criticise another culture by appealing to human values.
Cultural values are interpretations of humanity, conduct, institutions, and evaluations [Kekes]
     Full Idea: I distinguish four types of cultural values likely to be found in a particular society: interpretations of human values; forms of expression and conduct; institutions and practices within them; and modes of evaluation.
     From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 05.2)
     A reaction: He proceeds to enlarge on these four. This sub-divides the second of his three main areas of value. I like philosophers who do that sort of thing. It gives you the reassuring feeling that you can break a problem down into elements we understand....
The big value problems are evil (humanity), disenchantment (cultures), and boredom (individuals) [Kekes]
     Full Idea: The major problem for the human dimension of values is the prevalence of evil; for the cultural dimension it is widespread disenchantment; and for the personal dimension it is pervasive boredom.
     From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 05.5)
     A reaction: Boldly simple claims, but quite persuasive. Presumably it is the evil in human beings, rather than natural evil (like earthquakes) that is the problem. Disenchantment must come through alienation from social values. Powerlessness, rather than boredom?
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Our attitudes include what possibilities we value, and also what is allowable, and unthinkable [Kekes]
     Full Idea: The beliefs, emotions, motives, and desires that form our attitudes ...include not only what possibilities we value, but also the limits we should not transgress. ...The strongest limit is what I call 'the unthinkable'.
     From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 03.2)
     A reaction: Another chance to link to my favourite idea from Democritus! Ideally we want a theory which shows how a vision of the possibilities immediately points to the limits, and to what is unthinkable.
Unconditional commitments are our most basic convictions, saying what must never be done [Kekes]
     Full Idea: Unconditional commitments are the most basic convictions we have. They tell us what we must not do no matter what, what we regard as outrageous, horrible, beyond the pale, or, in religious language, as sacrilegious.
     From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 03.3)
     A reaction: The Aztecs should have made rather different unconditional commitments from the ones they ended up with. How do you persuade someone to make such an unconditional commitment. Abortion seems to involve huge clashes here.
Doing the unthinkable damages ourselves, so it is more basic than any value [Kekes]
     Full Idea: Doing the unthinkable causes deep, often irreparable, damage to our sense of ourselves. ...That is why the unthinkable indicates a more basic commitment than what we have to any value.
     From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 03.3)
     A reaction: Kekes makes the interesting claim that what is unthinkable is so basic that it doesn't even count as a value - it is more like a fact of your own nature, which is prior to your values. Not sure about that.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love should be partial, and discriminate in favour of its object [Kekes]
     Full Idea: Love is personal and partial. It is not love if it does not discriminate in favor of its object.
     From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 09.4)
     A reaction: I agree with that, mainly on the grounds that this is the natural form of human love. Generalised love of mankind seems like a distortion, even if it is well-meaning.
Sentimental love distorts its object [Kekes]
     Full Idea: Love is sentimental if it exaggerates the virtues and minimises the vices of its object.
     From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 09.5)
     A reaction: Not sure about this. It implies that we should retain a streak of cold evaluative objectivity, even about the people we love most. There is difference between knowing a person's qualities, and the importance we attach to those qualities. Forgive vices!
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
Evil isn't explained by nature, by monsters, by uncharacteristic actions, or by society [Kekes]
     Full Idea: Four inadequate explanations of human evil attribute it to natural causes, moral monsters, uncharacteristic actions, and corrupting social conditions.
     From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 06.3)
     A reaction: He is addressing the 'secular problem of evil', which arises if you assume that human beings are essentially good, and then look around you. He says evil explains corrupting social conditions, so we can't be circular about it.
Evil is not deviation from the good, any more than good is a deviation from evil [Kekes]
     Full Idea: There is no more reason to think of evil as deviation from the good than there is to think of the good as deviation from evil.
     From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 02.2)
     A reaction: This is a political moderate right winger defending the concept of evil as a basic and inescapable component of existence, in contrast to liberals who tend to deny 'pure evil'.