Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Stephen Houlgate, A.C. Ewing and Rosalind Hursthouse

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4 ideas

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
21788 The moral will is self-determining, but the ethical will is met in society [Houlgate]
     Full Idea: Whereas the moral will understands the good to be something which it can recognise or determine by itself, the ethical will acknowledges the good to be something actual which it encounters in the world about it.
     From: Stephen Houlgate (An Introduction to Hegel [1991], 08 'Freedom')
     A reaction: I think these two terms have become blurred - or at least I have thoroughly lost track of them. I'm not sure whether it is good to have distinct terms for (Kantian) personal choice and for social expectations. Ethics is what Nietzsche attacks.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / d. Good as virtue
4358 Virtue may be neither sufficient nor necessary for eudaimonia [Hursthouse]
     Full Idea: Some critics say virtue is not necessary for eudaimonia (since the wicked sometimes flourish), and others say it is not sufficient (because virtuous behaviour sometimes ruins a life).
     From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.8)
     A reaction: Both criticisms seem wrong (the wicked don't 'flourish', and complete virtue never ruins lives, except in tragic dilemmas). But it is hard to prove them wrong.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
4337 Teenagers are often quite wise about ideals, but rather stupid about consequences [Hursthouse]
     Full Idea: Adolescents tend to be much more gormless about consequences than they are about ideals.
     From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.2 n12)
     A reaction: Very accurate, I'm afraid. But this cuts both ways. They seem to need education not in virtue, but simply in consequences.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
4324 Animals and plants can 'flourish', but only rational beings can have eudaimonia [Hursthouse]
     Full Idea: The trouble with 'flourishing' as a translation of 'eudaimonia' is that animals and even plants can flourish, but eudaimonia is possible only for rational beings.
     From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Intro)
     A reaction: 'Flourishing' still seems better than 'happy', which is centrally used now to refer to a state of mind, not a situation. 'Well being' seems good, and plants are usually permitted that.