display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
2 ideas
| 6866 | It is disturbing if we become unreal when we die, but if time is unreal, then we remain real after death [Le Poidevin] |
| Full Idea: For the A-theorists called 'presentists' the past is as unreal as the future, and reality leaves us behind once we die, which is disturbing; but B-theorists, who see time as unreal, say we are just as real after our deaths as we were beforehand. | |
| From: Robin Le Poidevin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.174) | |
| A reaction: See Idea 6865 for A and B theories. I wonder if this problem is only superficially 'disturbing'. Becoming unreal may sound more drastic than becoming dead, but they both sound pretty terminal to me. |
| 15190 | Evil can't be an illusion, because then the illusion that there is evil would be evil [Le Poidevin] |
| Full Idea: The view that evil is an illusion is self-refuting: that is, if there is no evil, the illusion that there is evil is certainly evil. | |
| From: Robin Le Poidevin (Intro to 'Questions of Time and Tense' [1998], 2) | |
| A reaction: [The idea comes from McTaggart, and Le Poidevin is quoting Dummett on it] |