Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Theophrastus, Lycophron and Plato

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13 ideas

22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
Plato measured the degree of reality by the degree of value [Nietzsche on Plato]
     Full Idea: Plato measured the degree of reality by the degree of value.
     From: comment on Plato (The Republic [c.374 BCE], 518d) by Friedrich Nietzsche - The Will to Power (notebooks) §572
     A reaction: A most interesting comment. It epitomises the Nietzschean reading of Plato, in which the will to power leads the sense of value, which in turn creates the metaphysics.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / b. Successful function
If something has a function then it has a state of being good [Plato]
     Full Idea: Anything which has been endowed with a function also has a state of being good.
     From: Plato (The Republic [c.374 BCE], 353b)
     A reaction: 'ought' from 'is'?
A thing's function is what it alone can do, or what it does better than other things [Plato]
     Full Idea: The function of anything is what it alone can do, or what it can do better than anything else.
     From: Plato (The Republic [c.374 BCE], 353a)
     A reaction: I take this concept to be the lynchpin of Aristotle's virtue ethics. Note that it arises earlier, in Plato. Perhaps he should say what it is 'meant to do'.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / d. Health
Goodness is mental health, badness is mental sickness [Plato]
     Full Idea: Goodness is a state of mental health, bloom and vitality; badness is a state of mental sickness, deformity and infirmity.
     From: Plato (The Republic [c.374 BCE], 444e)
     A reaction: A nice statement of the closeness of goodness to health for the Greeks. The key point is that health is a deeply natural concept, which bridges the fact-value divide.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
The just man does not harm his enemies, but benefits everyone [Plato]
     Full Idea: First, Socrates, you told me justice is harming your enemies and helping your friends. But later it seemed that the just man, since everything he does is for someone's benefit, never harms anyone.
     From: Plato (Clitophon [c.372 BCE], 410b)
     A reaction: Socrates certainly didn't subscribe to the first view, which is the traditional consensus in Greek culture. In general Socrates agreed with the views later promoted by Jesus.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love assists men in achieving merit and happiness [Plato]
     Full Idea: Phaedrus: Love is not only the oldest and most honourable of the gods, but also the most powerful to assist men in the acquisition of merit and happiness, both here and hereafter.
     From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 180b)
     A reaction: Maybe we should talk less of love as a feeling, and more as a motivation, not just in human relationships, but in activities like gardening and database compilation.
Love is desire for perpetual possession of the good [Plato]
     Full Idea: Love is desire for perpetual possession of the good.
     From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 206a)
     A reaction: Even the worst human beings often have lovers. 'Perpetual' is a nice observation.
Love follows beauty, wisdom is exceptionally beautiful, so love follows wisdom [Plato]
     Full Idea: Wisdom is one of the most beautiful of things, and Love is love of beauty, so it follows that Love must be a love of wisdom.
     From: Plato (The Symposium [c.384 BCE], 204b)
     A reaction: Good, but wisdom isn't the only exceptionally beautiful thing. Music is beautiful partly because it is devoid of ideas.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / h. Fine deeds
A good person is bound to act well, and this brings happiness [Plato]
     Full Idea: A good person is bound to do whatever he does well and successfully, and success brings fulfilment and happiness.
     From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 507c)
     A reaction: Not how we would see it, I guess, but this is the Greek idea that a good person is one who functions well. Anyone who functions well is probably having a good time.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
If we were invisible, would the just man become like the unjust? [Plato]
     Full Idea: Glaucon: with a ring of invisibility 'the just man would differ in no way from the unjust'.
     From: Plato (The Republic [c.374 BCE], 360c)
     A reaction: I think a highly altruistic person would behave well with the ring, but I'm sure Glaucon would claim that these habits would wear off after a while. But I doubt that.
Is it natural to simply indulge our selfish desires? [Plato]
     Full Idea: Callicles: Nature says the only authentic way of life is to do nothing to hinder or restrain the expansion of one's desires.
     From: Plato (Gorgias [c.387 BCE], 491e)
     A reaction: Sounds like the natural desires of a young single man. Parents and spouses have natural desires that focus on other people's desires.
Clever criminals do well at first, but not in the long run [Plato]
     Full Idea: Clever criminals are exactly like those runners who do well on the way up the track, and then flag on the way back.
     From: Plato (The Republic [c.374 BCE], 613b)
     A reaction: Presumably there is some concept of natural justice lurking behind this comparison. Apart from the money, though, it is hard to imagine any professional criminal leading a flourishing life.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
No one willingly and knowingly embraces evil [Plato]
     Full Idea: No one willingly goes to meet evil, or what he thinks is evil.
     From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 358d)
     A reaction: Presumably people who actively choose satanism can override this deep-seated attitude. But their adherence to evil usually seems to be rather restrained. A danger of tautology with ideas like this.