Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Anaxarchus, Galen and Philippa Foot

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40 ideas

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
22445 Morality shows murder is wrong, but not what counts as a murder [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
22444 A moral system must deal with the dangers and benefits of life [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / e. Ethical cognitivism
23683 Moral norms are objective, connected to facts about human goods [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
22392 Morality is inescapable, in descriptive words such as 'dishonest', 'unjust' and 'uncharitable' [Foot]
22451 All people need affection, cooperation, community and help in trouble [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
22485 Non-cognitivists give the conditions of use of moral sentences as facts about the speaker [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
22474 Unlike aesthetic evaluation, moral evaluation needs a concept of responsibility [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
23684 Morality gives everyone reasons to act, irrespective of their desires [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
23690 We all have reason to cultivate the virtues, even when we lack the desire [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
23685 Reason is not a motivator of morality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
23691 Rejecting moral rules may be villainous, but it isn't inconsistent [Foot]
23686 Moral reason is not just neutral, because morality is part of the standard of rationality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
23693 Practical rationality must weigh both what is morally and what is non-morally required [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
23431 Human defects are just like plant or animal defects [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
23687 Moral virtues arise from human nature, as part of what makes us good human beings [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
22477 Calling a knife or farmer or speech or root good does not involve attitudes or feelings [Foot]
22486 The mistake is to think good grounds aren't enough for moral judgement, which also needs feelings [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
23432 Concepts such as function, welfare, flourishing and interests only apply to living things [Foot]
22375 Moral judgements need more than the relevant facts, if the same facts lead to 'x is good' and 'x is bad' [Foot]
22493 Sterility is a human defect, but the choice to be childless is not [Foot]
22492 Virtues are as necessary to humans as stings are to bees [Foot]
23433 Humans need courage like a plant needs roots [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
22378 We can't affirm a duty without saying why it matters if it is not performed [Foot]
22487 Moral arguments are grounded in human facts [Foot]
22377 Whether someone is rude is judged by agreed criteria, so the facts dictate the value [Foot]
22376 Facts and values are connected if we cannot choose what counts as evidence of rightness [Foot]
22491 Moral evaluations are not separate from facts, but concern particular facts about functioning [Foot]
23434 There is no fact-value gap in 'owls should see in the dark' [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
22447 Saying something 'just is' right or wrong creates an illusion of fact and objectivity [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
23439 Principles are not ultimate, but arise from the necessities of human life [Foot]
22452 Do we have a concept of value, other than wanting something, or making an effort to get it? [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
23435 If you demonstrate the reason to act, there is no further question of 'why should I?' [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / b. Successful function
22381 Being a good father seems to depend on intentions, rather than actual abilities [Foot]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
22379 The meaning of 'good' and other evaluations must include the object to which they attach [Foot]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
22458 Consequentialists can hurt the innocent in order to prevent further wickedness [Foot]
22460 Why might we think that a state of affairs can be morally good or bad? [Foot]
22461 Good outcomes are not external guides to morality, but a part of virtuous actions [Foot]
22464 The idea of a good state of affairs has no role in the thought of Aristotle, Rawls or Scanlon [Foot]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
22497 Deep happiness usually comes from the basic things in life [Foot]
22498 Happiness is enjoying the pursuit and attainment of right ends [Foot]