Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Bernard Williams, Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM and Mark Fisher
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18 ideas
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
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4114
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Philosophers try to produce ethical theories because they falsely assume that ethics can be simple [Williams,B]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
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22453
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Moral conflicts have a different feeling and structure from belief conflicts [Williams,B, by Foot]
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22454
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We tolerate inconsistency in ethics but not in other beliefs (which reflect an independent order) [Williams,B, by Foot]
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22450
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If moral systems can't judge other moral systems, then moral relativism is true [Williams,B, by Foot]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
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2178
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In bad actions, guilt points towards victims, and shame to the agent [Williams,B]
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20168
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Blame usually has no effect if the recipient thinks it unjustified [Williams,B]
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20167
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Blame partly rests on the fiction that blamed agents always know their obligations [Williams,B]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
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4128
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Intuitionism has been demolished by critics, and no longer looks interesting [Williams,B]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
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4366
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We can't accept Aristotle's naturalism about persons, because it is normative and unscientific [Williams,B, by Hursthouse]
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4132
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The category of person is a weak basis for ethics, because it is not fixed but comes in degrees [Williams,B]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
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24007
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Emotivism saw morality as expressing emotions, and influencing others' emotions [Williams,B]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
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4134
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The weakness of prescriptivism is shown by "I simply don't like staying at good hotels" [Williams,B]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
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4135
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Some ethical ideas, such as 'treachery' and 'promise', seem to express a union of facts and values [Williams,B]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
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22410
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Maybe the unthinkable is a moral category, and considering some options is dishonourable or absurd [Williams,B]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
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22408
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Consequentialism assumes that situations can be compared [Williams,B]
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22411
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For a consequentialist massacring 7 million must be better than massacring 7 million and one [Williams,B]
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4120
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It is an error of consequentialism to think we just aim at certain states of affairs; we also want to act [Williams,B]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / i. Moral luck
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23282
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If all that matters in morality is motive and intention, that makes moral luck irrelevant [Williams,B]
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