Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Bonaventura, Baruch de Spinoza and Francesco Orsi

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28 ideas

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
4867 Whether nature is beautiful or orderly is entirely in relation to human imagination [Spinoza]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
21873 Men only agree in nature if they are guided by reason [Spinoza]
21872 We seek our own advantage, and virtue is doing this rationally [Spinoza]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
17189 The essence of man is modifications of the nature of God [Spinoza]
17207 By 'good' I mean what brings us ever closer to our model of human nature [Spinoza]
8019 Along with his pantheism, Spinoza equates ethics with the study of human nature [Spinoza, by MacIntyre]
17229 If infancy in humans was very rare, we would consider it a pitiful natural defect [Spinoza]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
18666 Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi]
18667 The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi]
18685 Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi]
18679 Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi]
18682 A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi]
18683 Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi]
18686 The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
18672 Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
4845 We don't want things because they are good; we judge things to be good because we want them [Spinoza]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
18677 A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
18668 Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi]
18670 The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi]
18669 Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
4848 Love is nothing else but pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause [Spinoza]
17217 Love is joy with an external cause [Spinoza]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
7833 Spinoza names self-interest as the sole source of value [Spinoza, by Stewart,M]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
17224 If our ideas were wholly adequate, we would have no concept of evil [Spinoza]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
21870 Music is good for a melancholic, bad for a mourner, and indifferent to the deaf [Spinoza]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
4860 Man's highest happiness consists of perfecting his understanding, or reason [Spinoza]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
4847 Pleasure is a passive state in which the mind increases in perfection [Spinoza]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
4859 Pleasure is only bad in so far as it hinders a man's capability for action [Spinoza]