Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Cleanthes, Irenaeus and W. David Ross
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22 ideas
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / e. Ethical cognitivism
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5911
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Moral duties are as fundamental to the universe as the axioms of mathematics [Ross]
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5926
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The beauty of a patch of colour might be the most important fact about it [Ross]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
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7259
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Ross said moral principles are self-evident from the facts, but not from pure thought [Ross, by Dancy,J]
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5913
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The moral convictions of thoughtful educated people are the raw data of ethics [Ross]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
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5920
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Value is held to be either a quality, or a relation (usually between a thing and a mind) [Ross]
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5923
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The arguments for value being an objective or a relation fail, so it appears to be a quality [Ross]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
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5918
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The thing is intrinsically good if it would be good when nothing else existed [Ross]
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5930
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All things being equal, we all prefer the virtuous to be happy, not the vicious [Ross]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / e. Means and ends
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5922
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An instrumentally good thing might stay the same, but change its value because of circumstances [Ross]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
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5921
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We can ask of pleasure or beauty whether they are valuable, but not of goodness [Ross]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
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5910
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The three intrinsic goods are virtue, knowledge and pleasure [Ross]
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5932
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The four goods are: virtue, pleasure, just allocation of pleasure, and knowledge [Ross]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
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5898
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'Right' and 'good' differ in meaning, as in a 'right action' and a 'good man' [Ross]
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5899
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If there are two equally good acts, they may both be right, but neither a duty [Ross]
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5904
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In the past 'right' just meant what is conventionally accepted [Ross]
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5919
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Goodness is a wider concept than just correct ethical conduct [Ross]
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5941
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Motives decide whether an action is good, and what is done decides whether it was right [Ross]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / d. Good as virtue
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5938
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Virtue is superior to pleasure, as pleasure is never a duty, but goodness is [Ross]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / e. Good as knowledge
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5931
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All other things being equal, a universe with more understanding is better [Ross]
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5939
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Morality is not entirely social; a good moral character should love truth [Ross]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
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5905
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We clearly value good character or understanding, as well as pleasure [Ross]
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5929
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No one thinks it doesn't matter whether pleasure is virtuously or viciously acquired [Ross]
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