Combining Philosophers
Ideas for David O. Brink, Francis Hutcheson and Jason Crease
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16 ideas
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
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6238
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We approve of actions by a superior moral sense [Hutcheson]
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6239
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We dislike a traitor, even if they give us great benefit [Hutcheson]
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6240
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The moral sense is not an innate idea, but an ability to approve or disapprove in a disinterested way [Hutcheson]
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6242
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We cannot choose our moral feelings, otherwise bribery could affect them [Hutcheson]
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6247
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Everyone feels uneasy when seeing others in pain, unless the others are evil [Hutcheson]
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6256
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Can't the moral sense make mistakes, as the other senses do? [Hutcheson]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
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2848
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Two people might agree in their emotional moral attitude while disagreeing in their judgement [Brink]
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2851
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Emotivists find it hard to analyse assertions of moral principles, rather than actual judgements [Brink]
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2853
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Emotivists claim to explain moral motivation by basing morality on non-cognitive attitudes [Brink]
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2852
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Emotivists tend to favour a redundancy theory of truth, making moral judgement meaningless [Brink]
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2849
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Emotivism implies relativism about moral meanings, but critics say disagreements are about moral reference [Brink]
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2850
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How can emotivists explain someone who recognises morality but is indifferent to it? [Brink]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
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6244
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Human nature seems incapable of universal malice, except what results from self-love [Hutcheson]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
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6243
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As death approaches, why do we still care about family, friends or country? [Hutcheson]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
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6246
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My action is not made good by a good effect, if I did not foresee and intend it [Hutcheson]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
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6252
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Happiness is a pleasant sensation, or continued state of such sensations [Hutcheson]
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