Combining Philosophers

Ideas for David O. Brink, Francis Hutcheson and Jason Crease

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12 ideas

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism

6238	We approve of actions by a superior moral sense [Hutcheson]

6239	We dislike a traitor, even if they give us great benefit [Hutcheson]

6240	The moral sense is not an innate idea, but an ability to approve or disapprove in a disinterested way [Hutcheson]

6242	We cannot choose our moral feelings, otherwise bribery could affect them [Hutcheson]

6247	Everyone feels uneasy when seeing others in pain, unless the others are evil [Hutcheson]

6256	Can't the moral sense make mistakes, as the other senses do? [Hutcheson]

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism

2848	Two people might agree in their emotional moral attitude while disagreeing in their judgement [Brink]

2851	Emotivists find it hard to analyse assertions of moral principles, rather than actual judgements [Brink]

2853	Emotivists claim to explain moral motivation by basing morality on non-cognitive attitudes [Brink]

2852	Emotivists tend to favour a redundancy theory of truth, making moral judgement meaningless [Brink]

2849	Emotivism implies relativism about moral meanings, but critics say disagreements are about moral reference [Brink]

2850	How can emotivists explain someone who recognises morality but is indifferent to it? [Brink]